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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis is to provide an overview of the field of posthumanist thought 
and specifically to look at the implications posthumanism can have for media and 
communication theory. I will discuss a few of the key concepts in the posthumanist 
turn that has taken place in various disciplines and analyse how they relate to media 
and communication. The question to be investigated is how the already fluid concept 
of media is affected by posthumanism. It will also explore the work of the media 
researchers in this posthumanist and new materialist turn and discuss why 
posthumanism is interesting for media studies. Since this a theoretical thesis, it stays 
primarily on a conceptual level, yet it will hopefully be clear how these theoretical 
issues can have great implications on a more concrete and practical level, also in 
relation to media theory. 
 
Posthumanism is a field in motion and it is transforming itself in numerous 
directions. Many scholars mean fundamentally different things when they talk about 
posthumanism. Firstly, I will observe similarities and differences in their views and 
through that define the posthumanism reflected on in this thesis. Secondly, the 
concept of naturecultures, and post-anthropocentrism will be examined. Thirdly, it 
will be discussed what theoretical and methodological implications posthumanism 
has for how we understand concepts in media and communication theory in general. 
Lastly, I will explore how these posthumanist influences have begun to manifest 
themselves in research regarding media and communication, such as in the notions of 
medianatures, evil media, media machines and the geology of media.  
 
My own role and interest in the topic has a few different sources. While writing a 
bachelor’s thesis on visual representations on the intersections of gender, race, class 
and sexuality, I read many texts by researchers in the field of gender studies. Some of 
them were disappointed in what the use of quantitative studies in relation to gender 
in representation can achieve, claiming that we have known the unequal numbers in 
gender representations in 30-40 years but not much has changed. For example 
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Gallagher (2001, 6-7) suggested more qualitative studies on the topic, and analysis of 
power relations and situations in which different social categories get different 
treatment for media studies. 
 
When starting with this thesis I could hear myself repeating this way of thinking, but 
taking it one step further. We have known the qualitative differences in 
representation for many years, yet it seems like we do not get any further. It is 
definitely not that the research on representation would not be needed or important, 
but instead frustration over that one does not seem to get longer than realizing this 
inequality, how different social groups get different and unequal representation. 
What can be done with that information? What about the real embodied relations this 
unfair representation leads to? What if a focus on only representation instead of 
material realities contributes to concealing the most important mechanisms behind 
the same social inequalities?   
 
I hope that a more material and interdisciplinary take on media and information 
could be a way of opening up discussions and possibly also new practices. Just like 
the historian Ewa Domanska, I discovered that tools like “semiotics, psychoanalysis, 
discourse theories, poststructuralism, hermeneutics, etc.) did not help me understand 
the most fundamental”, that is, how to “transcend binary oppositions” (Domanska 
2010, 124). How do they intersect and operate together? Domanska continues: 
 
“Studying various figurations of subjectivity, we may notice that the conventional 
criteria based on the cultural and social understanding of the subject and the dualist, 
hierarchical thinking in terms of the organic/ inorganic and human/nonhuman have 
become insufficient, while the popular vision of constructivism, which conceives of 
race, gender and other aspects of identity as products of culture, limits the scope of 
humanistic research“ (Domanska 2010, 124) 
 
The observations by Domanska above are key issues, pointing at the curiosity that 
might lead one towards a posthumanist path. But my interest in this is not only 
coming from negative grounds, but also from feelings of excitement. Here I wish to 
borrow from Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, the editors of New Materialism 
(2010), who eloquently express the thrilling aspect of the topic, the “sense of 
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encountering the emergence of new paradigms for which no overall orthodoxy has 
yet been established”. It is both liberating and restricting to start to dig in to 
something still so fluid, where one constantly has to challenge one’s own thinking. 
 
The thought of something posthuman is probably mainly made familiar through 
science fiction, where a meeting with aliens and cyborgs is nothing out of the 
ordinary. So when posthumanism comes along and introduces animals as subjects, 
objects as actors and semiotics as materiality, it is understandable if some react with 
a healthy bit of scepticism. Despite the subversive metaphors, tropes and figurations, 
which are carefully created to be exactly that, the posthumanism that will be 
explored here is quite far away from outer space and sci-fi narratives. The point is 
not to ignore things like satellites but posthumanism suggests as much a focus on 
mundane things like dust, doors or dogs. These material aspects affect the world and 
its inhabitants as well as how they relate to and communicate with each other.  
 
This thesis could hopefully be a small part of a different way of looking at 
communication, non-humans and familiar concepts but in a new light. After 
hundreds of years of more or less dominant Western anthropocentric thought in 
academia, it is thrilling to expand ones point of departure in approaching the world. 
This is of course controversial and the topic of many hard debates. Another 
controversial aspect might be that the topic is not approached by comparing it to 
more predominant frameworks such as post-structuralism but rather by taking 
“materialities seriously” (Latimer & Miele 2013, 16). Instead of a comparison, I have 
tried to dive into the world of posthumanism by approaching influential theories and 
authors, and keeping the discussion and the critique inside the posthumanist 
movement. This approach to theory is formulate by a prominent scholar in the 
movement, Bruno Latour: 
 
“For me, theory is like the plug-ins we have on computers or the internet. If you 
don’t have the right plug-in, you just don’t see things on the screen. If you download 
the plug-in, you see things and you can run the little gimmick that people have put 
into their web page. Theory for me is like that. A concept has to make a difference. If 
you download this very specific plug-in of the human and non-human connection, 
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you can see things and do things on the screen or in research that you couldn’t see or 
you couldn’t animate before. It’s not a moral point. I’m not advocating horrible 
things like mixing humans and non-humans. It’s not like zoophilia or that sort of 
thing. It’s a very precise question of research.” (Barron 2003, 78-79) 
 
My aim is to use the “plug-ins” of posthumanist theory to explore how this can, will 
and maybe should affect the concept of media and more generally theories on media 
and communication.  
 
1.1 Methodology and the structure of the thesis 
 
It is not too common to write a theoretical thesis in media and communication 
studies. This thesis would situate itself closer to media philosophy, and there we find 
the opposite, in philosophy anything else than a theoretical thesis would be 
exceptional. There are, however, a few guidelines to keep in mind even though the 
work does not use a formal method (such as e.g. critical discourse analysis). A 
philosophical thesis should be argumentative, precise and accessible for critique. 
One's aim should not be to create more uncertainty. (Hansson 1998, 48.)   
 
In a theoretical thesis as well as in qualitative research, the researcher, with his or her 
values and thoughts, becomes even more present. As in quantitative research, 
verification of research results is important in qualitative research. One's research has 
to be proven credible, and in order to do that there are a number of means. A 
traditional way is to determine the validity, reliability, generalizability and 
objectivity of the research. 
 
These categories are not, however, ideal for proving the credibility of qualitative 
research or a theoretical thesis. Since it is impossible to measure qualitative research 
in the same way as quantitative, the discussion on what to do divides researchers. 
(Denscombe 2009, 378-379.)  
 
One way to handle the problem is to look at multiple validities instead of (one) 
validity.  Rather than to cling onto a highly contested notion of an objective truth 
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about social phenomena, multiple validities can make a researcher aware of both the 
political aspect of one's research and how multidimensional the social is and can be 
perceived. Instead of one overarching validity one can find the one which best works 
for a particular research. The three different validities can be categorized into 
“dialogic”, “contextualist” and “deconstructive” validity (Saukko 2003, 19). The 
dialogic validity means to approach what one is researching, not objectively from the 
outside but instead to try to make justice to the way the subject of research is 
experiencing something, “how well the researcher fulfils the ethical imperative to be 
true to, and to respect, other people’s lived worlds and realities” (Saukko 2003, 20). 
The context of the research is of special importance for the contextualist validity that 
aims at taking other important historical and societal aspects in consideration for the 
research. It also means being aware that one’s research is part of shaping the 
“multiple realities” out there. (Saukko 2003, 21-22.) 
 
The deconstructive validity is the one of most interest for this particular thesis, since 
“it assesses the value of research in terms of how well it unravels problematic social 
discourses that mediate the way in which we perceive reality” (Saukko 2003, 19). 
According to this methodological point of view there is not anything like an unbiased 
way of researching and looking at the world. Therefore, the awareness of the 
ideology of one’s research can be an indicator of validity. The deconstructive validity 
and the ways to look at the formation of different realities and truths are “postmodern 
excess”, “genealogical historicity” and “deconstructive critique”. 
 
Under the headline of postmodern excess, research is valued based on how well it 
can show different ways of approaching and understanding a phenomenon or 
perceived truth. Another aspect is if research can question different so called 
“truths”, that are taken for granted, through showing the history of how the “truth” is 
formed, the genealogy of the truth, the validity of the research has genealogical 
historicity. Lastly, valid research should be able to deconstruct the binaries that are 
important for our understanding of the topic of research. (Saukko 2003, 20-21.)     
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As another suggestion to the above, Donna Haraway calls for a feminist objectivity 
called situated knowledges, “[a]ll knowledge is a condensed node in an agnostic 
power field” (Haraway 1988, 577). The more one is aware of the power relations in 
one’s research, the bigger the possibility for situated objectivity. As a researcher one 
should, according to Haraway, situate oneself as a makers of knowledge in an 
ideological community instead of isolating oneself as detached individuals. The 
conventional objective researcher is sometimes presented as some sort of a separate, 
completely objective, transcendental being who is “seeing everything from nowhere” 
(Haraway 1988, 581) or as Haraway calls it, the God trick. Instead of trying to take 
the role of a disembodied God, Haraway asks for an embodied objectivity, a feminist 
objectivity, in which we are aware of from which point we are seeing and that seeing 
is always a question of power (Haraway 1988, 581-90). 
 
According to a radical social constructionist point of view, there is no objective truth 
or real reality that we can find or measure concerning posthumanism, or anything 
else for that matter, which does not mean that it would be false (Kvale 2002, 306-
307). Different researchers define things in different ways and what something is 
keeps changing, some might find a particular concept more important than others. 
Through that, we all take part in constructing what is considered to be real about, in 
this case, posthumanism, as well as shaping the world through researching it. 
 
Another alternative validity, apart from dialogic, deconstructive and contextualist 
validities, discussed by Saukko (2003, 27-29), that goes hand in hand with the theory 
in this thesis, is the material-semiotic perspective. From this perspective, it is not 
only words which are creating meaning, but also the materiality of research, 
“knowledge is always an engaged material practice” (Haraway 2004, 199). From the 
material-semiotic perspective research is not separate from the social phenomenon it 
is studying but “as a force that alters or creates reality in both symbolic and material 
terms” (Saukko 2003, 27). This is explained with the example of a debate between 
Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, where Foucault points out that the research 
about psychiatry for example has very real and material consequences of depriving 
certain people of their possibility to decide on their own affairs and locking them up 
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(Saukko 2003, 27- 28). Such material-semiotic perspective is fundamental for 
posthumanism (Lummaa 2014, 275). 
 
There are numerous ways of approaching a subject like this. I have chosen to focus 
on a number of concepts and thinkers that I find constantly reoccurring, important 
and constantly referred to. I have found it important to go all the way to the most 
crucial but provocative concepts of this way to parses the world, which at first 
glimpse might seem like they have very little to do with media and communication. 
The reason for this is that I find it necessary to thoroughly look into what this 
posthumanism thought really is challenging, or arguing for. This means for example 
challenging culture as a category. From there one can then turn the gaze to media and 
communication. 
 
One possibility, quite an obvious one, would have been to focus more on the 
human/machine relationship when it comes to communication. There are many texts 
on the topic. Instead, I find the theories and concepts which look away from the 
human more challenging, subversive and rewarding. To include both a more 
anthropocentric and post-anthropocentric posthumanism would not be possible in the 
realm of a master’s thesis. This comes with a limitation that leaves out important 
thinkers and thoughts. For example, taking into account the impact Katherine Hayles 
has had on the discourse, some might find that her presence is not large enough. In 
the next chapter intertwining discourses surrounding the posthuman will be 
explained. 
 
When dealing with something like posthumanism, it is easy to approach it from the 
outside, like it is something strange and peculiar. As mentioned in the Introduction, I 
situate myself looking from the “inside” on posthumanist theories, not from the 
outside. Timonthy Pachirat (2005, 423) locates research done in the social sciences 
based on whom it is for and for what purpose it is done. Pachirat makes a division 
into basic research and research aiming for change, as well as for a disciplinary 
audience and a practitioner audience. The four sections he outlines are basic, applied, 
revisionary-disciplinary and finally practice, social and organizational change. Just as 
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for most critical theory, feminist and queer theory as well as critical race theory, the 
research is revisionary-disciplinary, meaning it is theory-building and theory-
changing. (Ibid.) It is research that aims to create new information and trying to 
transform the ways of looking at the world. This could also be said to be the case for 
most scientific inquiry, and definitely for physics. This thesis joins them by critically 
examining theory with an aim to be at least slightly emancipatory.  
 
To be able to work systematically when approaching this topic, the theories will be 
discussed both in an author-lead and thematic style. I have tried to situate the 
theories, concepts and thoughts as clearly as possible by always stating the name of 
the author behind the argument. From a stylistic perspective, this might not be the 
best way of writing but dealing with so many theories, thinkers as well as a 
controversial topic, this seems like the best way to proceed. In order to emphasize the 
character of posthumanist thinking, citations are used here and there to illustrate their 
way of thinking more properly. Since the thesis is analysing published texts and not 
private persons the ethical concerns about privacy, confidentiality and consent so that 
the research would do no harm becomes minimal (Berg & Lune 2012, 61).  
 
The structure of this thesis moves from general posthumanist thoughts to specific 
media related issues. In Chapter Two posthumanism is defined by distinguishing it 
from other similar lines of thinking. A brief history over posthumanism is also 
presented. The fields in which posthumanist and new materialist thinking has been 
most prominent is gender studies and science and technology studies (Åsberg 2012a, 
7), therefore the chapter also contains a look into the scholars working with 
posthumanist concepts in those fields. Chapter Three goes deeper into the main 
concepts of the overall posthumanist turn, concepts which are crucial for the 
theoretical turn and which might be helpful for understanding posthumanism for 
media and communication studies. The strive away from anthropocentrism and the 
continuum of nature and culture will be discussed in that chapter. What 
posthumanism can mean for media and communication studies is explored in 
Chapter Four by looking at media focused posthumanist concepts, some which are 
already developed as well as more on going thought-processes. There it will be 
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explored how the ontological framework of posthumanism works with media and 
communication theory, what exists and how does it operate?  
 
Posthumanism brings with it the possibility to explore the beauty and mind-
blowingness of the universe and to probe questions like how the stars in the sky work 
as media. This is at the same time as one can investigate how power relations are 
uphold on an unjust and potentially lethal planet, in other words, what operates and 
how? How is that linked to media? Where does one start and how can one not at least 
try to start, and aim to take part in the “rewriting of all possible and impossible forms 
of emancipation” (Dolpijn & van der Tuin 2010, 86)?  
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2. Posthumanism in context 
 
In this chapter posthumanism will be defined as well as located historically and 
theoretically. Since such a fluid and broad concept or movement is highly difficult to 
define, it will be done partly by distinguishing it from other similar concepts and 
lines of thought like the posthuman, new materialism and transhumanism. This 
chapter also includes a quick look into posthumanist key thinkers and concepts in the 
fields of gender studies and science and technology studies, since it clarifies the roots 
and the basis for the theory that is being developed today. The short history of 
posthumanism provided will trace it back to 1977. 
 
2.1 Defining posthumanism 
 
One aspect distinguishing posthumanism from other theoretical movements is its 
unusually high degree of interdisciplinarity. It is a similar but varied posthumanism 
that is popping up in various academic disciplines. It is explored in the old 
disciplines of philosophy and physics, geography and sociology as well as in the 
newer studies like media, science and technology, gender and animal studies. 
 
The use of the word posthumanism and the theories surrounding it in different 
disciplines naturally gives it different names. The movement or “turn” goes under 
various loose tags like the material turn (as opposed to the linguistic turn), the 
speculative turn or the ontological turn. The different paths into the ways of thinking 
of these turns can start with cyborgs and monster, actor-network theory, object-
oriented ontology or the media of insects. Even though they are all very separate 
theories and lines of thought, they can all be somehow labelled under or affiliated 
with posthumanism. 
 
How can we then define this disorderly movement? To start with the name, the word 
“post” in posthumanism is not used to symbolize something that comes after 
humanism, but something that is different from humanism (Badmington 2006, 266). 
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The post is there to brake with humanistic ways of thinking, to help one grasp what it 
can mean to think beyond the humanities, while ironically, often still inside the 
humanities. The “post” is supposed to invite your mind into subversive tracks, to 
think outside the human. One example of what that could mean is driven by 
philosopher and feminist theorist Rosi Braidotti (2013) with her takes on 
anthropocentrism, or more precisely a lack of it. Braidotti, among others, writes a 
post-anthropocentric point of view for posthumanism, where one gets rid of 
Anthropos as the point of departure, which then can lead to that: “animals, insects, 
plants and the environment, in fact the planet and the cosmos as a whole, are called 
into play” (Braidotti 2013, 66). 
 
In the realm of a master’s thesis in communication, it is not fruitful or even possible 
to provide full coverage of what is happening in all disciplines and studies exploring 
posthumanism. Neil Badmington, the author of many books on posthumanism, in an 
attempt to do exactly that, explains the difficulty with mapping posthumanism as 
such: 
 
“An attempt to provide a complete overview, an A- Z, an encyclopaedia of 
posthumanism, could only lead, I feel, to the situation described in 'On exactitude in 
science', the short story by Jorge Luis Borges which is, no doubt, well known to 
geographers. The tale is told, he writes, of an empire that devoted so much time and 
energy to producing comprehensive maps of its territory that the map of the empire 
eventually became as big as the empire itself, leading future generations to see the 
pointlessness of the activity and turn their back on maps and those who make them.“ 
(Badmington 2004, 1344) 
 
Besides the problems Badmington describes in mapping posthumanism, there is a 
range of other questions that occur when one is trying to define it. There are great 
differences in theoretical and methodological framework from one posthumanist to 
another, which is not a big surprise when so many representatives of different 
disciplines meet each other under one name. The use of the (same) terminology can 
differ in separate disciplines. The way into posthumanism vary between traditions, a 
media scholar naturally has a different theoretical background and understanding 
than a philosopher or a physicist. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary aspect of many 
of the works and scholars can create limitations. For example, Karen Barad has 
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become one of the more well-known posthumanists through her work of combining 
feminist theory and quantum physics. The knowledge of quantum physics, for 
someone coming from the social sciences is mostly very limited, if not non-existent. 
Therefore, one might not be capable of discussing Barad in a way that would do 
complete justice to her work. Still Barad is frequently used by students and scholars 
who possibly have never read a line of quantum physics or ever solved a quantum 
physics equation. This highlights a limitation of posthumanism and a possible 
problem with accuracy. One’s ability to have knowledge about the separate 
disciplines might create problems. That said, it is also one aspect that is interesting 
with the turn, a close collaboration with natural and social sciences, combining 
theories from both sides. 
 
Despite the differences, there are however things that posthumanists have in 
common; their view on the role of materiality (Åsberg et al. 2012, 26), 
anthropocentrism (Braidotti 2013) and their will to get rid of dualisms that could be 
called a post-dualistic approach (Ferrando 2013, 27). Therefore one can specify the 
form of posthumanism discussed in this thesis: posthumanism is an interdisciplinary 
conceptual framework, which acknowledges the potential of the materiality around 
us to produce meaning. It sees that it is not only language that produces discursive 
meaning, but also materiality (Åsberg et al. 2012, 23; my translation). This view of 
materialism is different from historical and dialectical materialism. An important 
aspect of posthumanist theory is also contesting the Cartesian legacy of the 
mind/body-dualism and a ”refusal to a priori create opposites like nature and culture, 
semiotics and materiality, […] take them for granted or to hierarchize them” (Åsberg 
et al. 2012, 38; my translation). 
 
Another way to put it is to say that “[p]osthumanist thinking is searching for 
alternative, non-essentialist and non-hierarchical ways of understanding the features 
of different beings and their inter-related relations.” (Lummaa & Rojola 2014 14; my 
translation) or to call it a distinctive kind of philosophy: 
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“Posthumanism is a philosophy which provides a suitable way of departure to think 
in relational and multi-layered ways, expanding the focus to the non-human realm in 
post-dualistic, post-hierarchical modes, thus allowing one to envision post-human 
futures which will radically stretch the boundaries of human imagination.” (Ferrando 
2013, 30) 
 
Under this philosophy one could also subdivide posthumanism into critical, cultural 
and philosophical posthumanism based on from where it has been developed and 
worked on. Depending on if it has emerged through critical theory, cultural studies or 
from a more philosophical point of departure it can be named differently. (Ferrando 
2013, 29.) Just like Ferrando (2013, 32), I understand posthumanism as cultural, 
critical and philosophical posthumanism and new materialism. 
 
To make the notion of posthumanism which is used in this thesis even clearer, the 
following subchapters will elaborate on the similarities and differences between 
posthumanism and the posthuman, new materialism and transhumanism. 
 
2.1.2 Difference between the posthuman and posthumanism 
 
One separation that helps to clarify posthumanism is the difference between the 
concept of the posthuman and posthumanism, which are close but not the same. 
Francesca Ferrando (2012, 9) differentiates them by calling posthumanism “a shift in 
the humanistic paradigm and its anthropocentric Weltanschauung” while the 
posthuman mostly refers to different areas like bioethics, nanotechnology and 
robotics. 
 
One way to understand the concepts is to look at their relation to humans. Are they 
directing their focus on the (post)human or away from the human? An example to 
clarify the differences is that posthumanism often turns to animals and objects in a 
strive to include them as actors in the world, while the ones focusing on the 
posthuman tend to turn to robots, “the posthuman in its more nefarious forms is 
construed as an informational pattern that happens to be instantiated in a biological 
substrate” (Hayles 2006, 161). In the example of computer-assisted surgery we 
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already see a close collaboration between humans and intelligent machines (Hayles 
1999, 284). This means discussing the posthuman when for example talking about 
plastic surgery of humans or computer-assisted surgery but posthumanism when 
talking about more abstract things like knowledge production or critique of the 
humanist Enlightenment ideals. Posthumanism does not mean that the human should 
be completely ignored but given the right dimensions. 
 
One way to look at the difference is to view posthumanism as a position to think 
from, and the posthuman as a field of research interests where one is “rethinking the 
articulation of humans with intelligent machines” (Hayles 1999, 287). Ferrando 
(2012, 9-10) reminds us that posthumanism and theories of the posthuman can 
include each other’s perspectives but that they are not the same thing. The difference 
between the concepts is not absolute, but partly complementary. The posthuman still 
affects the way we see humans even though it might not challenge anthropocentrism. 
The focus of this thesis is on posthumanism, not the posthuman and the content of 
theory on things like human-machine relations, robotics and cybernetics will be very 
limited.   
 
The above mentioned posthuman should not be confused with the posthuman as 
discussed by the conservative political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his book Our 
Posthuman Future (2002). Due to advances in biotechnology Fukuyama wants to 
raise concern about what is happening to humans and their “nature”. This is a 
completely opposite political project than the posthumanist one, where binary 
categories such as nature/culture, subject/object and mind/body are gotten rid of, and 
shall not be confused with each other. Yet, one could speculate if both are reactions 
on the same transformations of our realities. 
 
2.1.3 New materialism 
 
One main theoretical tool in the posthumanist discussion is the new-found interest in 
materiality and that interest is developed further under the name of new materialism. 
Rosi Braidotti and Manuel Delanda are both credited for creating new materialism, 
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but separately from each other (van der Tuin & Dolpijn 2012, 93; Ferrando 2013, 
30). Braidotti's thinking in relation to new materialism and posthumanism will be 
elaborated on in the following chapters since she has done work more generally on 
posthumanism and anthropocentrism, specifically focusing on sexualisation, 
racialization and naturalization. Delanda has done interesting work on war, 
technology and (re)developments of Gilles Deleuze's assemblages (see e.g. Delanda 
1991 and 2006) which does not directly touch upon the same topics discussed here so 
unfortunately there is not space for Delanda.  
 
The materialism that the new materialists are building on is not a materialism that we 
know as historical materialism or dialectical materialism. Instead, what is meant is a 
very concrete, and embodied materiality, consisting of matter, things and materials.  
New materialism is also interested in more abstract things like “processes that take 
place in the heart of stars, suffering from cancer, or transforming fossil fuels into 
greenhouse gases” (Bryant 2014, 2). This line of thinking could maybe be viewed as 
a new twist to philosophical materialism, what exists is matter, adding on what the 
post-structuralists argued about the social. 
 
The critique is that matter is missing from what we know as materialism, that 
”[m]aterialism has come to mean simply that something is historical, socially 
constructed, involves cultural practices, and is contingent” (Bryant 2014, 2). Instead 
the scholars who are using new materialism, often still inside social sciences, want to 
look at what is perceived to be outside the semiotic and discursive, such as dust, 
tables, muscles, trees and microbes. To be able to understand and analyse systemic 
and structural violence and oppression, and what is holding up these unequal 
relations, the new materialist position is that language and ideology is not enough, 
that we also have to look at the material aspects of power relations.   
 
If one is to try the almost impossible task of distinguishing new materialism from 
posthumanism, the literary scholars Lummaa and Rojola (2014, 23) suggest looking 
into the thinkers who have been most influential and important for new materialism. 
Clearly, Deleuze and Guattari are important for new materialism and with them come 
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Baruch Spinoza as well as Henry Bergson and Alfred North Whitehead. One cannot 
say the same about posthumanism which is more fluctuating in its influences and is 
broader in its theoretical framework. 
 
Ferrando (2013, 30) calls new materialism a ”specific movement within the 
posthumanist theoretical scenario” and more specifically an answer to the 
”representationalist and constructivist radicalizations of late postmodernity”. This 
reaction is a radical remodelling of the view of nature and culture, getting rid of their 
boundaries, which consistently include the borders between materiality and language. 
The point being, to perceive how nature and culture work together, that they together 
create what exists by seeing that ”biology is culturally mediated as much as culture is 
materialistically constructed” (Ferrando 2013, 31). Another important aspect in 
understanding new materialism is the process-ontological view of matter, seeing it 
not as something fixed but ”as an on going process of materialization” (ibid.) and 
becoming. The above mentioned aspects which Ferrando attributes to new 
materialism are aspects which Åsberg describes in posthumansim (2012a, 16, 29-31). 
Here it should be noted that when Ferrando uses the term posthumanism, new 
materialism is included in the concept for her. For Åsberg they are different names 
for the same kind of thinking (2012a, 16). 
 
2.1.4 Transhumanism 
 
In order to avoid possible confusions, posthumanism has to be distinguished from 
transhumanism. Transhumanism could have been left out of the thesis completely 
since the line of thinking is so different, if not opposite, to the posthumanism 
discussed here but due to the similar terminology, I find it necessary to quickly 
explain the differences. The posthumanism discussed in this thesis is not to be 
confused with transhumanism (see e.g. Ray Kurzweil 1999, 2005; Hans Moravec 
1999; Nick Bostrom 2009). Even though using the same or similar terminology (e.g. 
cyborgs, posthuman), the premise for them is crucially different in comparison to 
posthumanism. The road to the posthuman is, for transhumanists, an upgrade into a 
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“better human”. This is problematic already without touching upon a possible ethics 
of advances in technology. 
 
Ferrando notes that transhumanism is building on the ideas of the Enlightenment, 
embracing notions like rationality and progress, turning transhumanism into a sort of 
“ultrahumanism” (2013, 27-28): 
 
“Considering that a large number of the world's population is still occupied with 
mere survival, if the reflection on desirable futures was reduced to an overestimation 
of this technological kinship of the human revisited in its specific technical 
outcomes, such a preference would confine it to a classist and techno-centric 
movement.” (Ferrando 2013, 28) 
 
Also according to Wolfe (2010, xv), transhumanism is an intensification of 
humanism. One major difference and a way to distinguish transhumanism and 
posthumanism is the anthropocentric worldview. Anthropocentrism is present in 
transhumanism, and this position could even be described as an intensification of 
anthropocentrism. Kathrine Hayles' critique of Hans Moravec functions as an 
example of this: 
 
“When Moravec imagines 'you' choosing to download yourself into a computer, 
thereby obtaining through technological mastery the ultimate privilege of 
immortality, he is not abandoning the autonomous liberal subject but is expanding its 
prerogatives into the realm of the posthuman.” (Hayles 1999, 287) 
 
When posthumanism is aiming to go beyond humanism, transhumanism aims to 
intensify it and instead enhance the human. The transhumanist might hope for the 
immortal transcendental subject through computers, “the human 2.0”, which is 
definitely not on the agenda for posthumanism. Still, it needs to be mentioned that 
the posthumanist critique of transhumanism does not emanate from some kind of 
moral indignation about how technology changes human and non-human lives, but is 
rather directed at the philosophical premises and aims of transhumanism, which are 
considered to be misguided. Some would also call transhumanism posthumanism 
since it is aiming at something which is post the human as we know it today.  
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2.2 A brief history of posthumanism 
 
Even though the word posthuman(ism) might have been used vaguely before, the 
first critical use of the word posthumanism dates back to the 1977 and literary 
theorist Ihab Hassan (Herbrechter 2013, 33-34). In the text Prometheus as a 
Performer, Hassan claims that 500 years of humanism is over and that we are 
transforming into, and facing something “that we must helplessly call 
posthumanism” (Hassan 1977, 843).   
 
It takes more than fifteen years after Hassan's text for the term posthumanism or 
posthuman to become used and widely accepted in the mid-1990s (Wolfe 2010, xii; 
Herbrechter 2013, 36). One of the first highly influential books was How We Became 
Posthuman (1999) by Kathrine N. Hayles (Herbrechter 2013, 36). Hayles (2006, 
160) sees both the posthuman and “the 'human’, as a historically specific and 
contingent term rather than a stable ontology”. Before Hayles, works by Donna 
Haraway and Bruno Latour had been published but not profiled as posthumanist. 
Even today Haraway does not want to call herself a posthumanist (Gane 2006, 140) 
though her Cyborg Manifesto can be seen as the locus classicus of posthumanism 
(Wolfe 2010, xiii). 
 
The ideas and thoughts from where posthumanism springs is also partly traceable to 
the same period as the coinage of the word posthumanism. Rosi Braidotti (2013, 26) 
finds her own theoretical roots in the philosophical discussions of antihumanism in 
the 1970s, where we find thinkers like Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari as a possible gateway to posthumanism. Critique of humanism for being too 
European, imperialist, white, and male has also been voiced in post-colonial and 
feminist theory for decades (Braidotti 2013, 24-25). 
 
Also Cary Wolfe traces posthumanism back to post-structuralists like Jacques 
Derrida and Michel Foucault. In The Order of Things, first published in 1966, 
Foucault writes that “man is an invention of recent age. And one perhaps nearing its 
end” (Foucault 1977, 387). According to Wolfe (2010, xii) one can trace the 
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genealogy of posthumanism to start with the famous last paragraph in The Order of 
Things, ending with the words “then one can certainly wager that man would be 
erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault 1977, 387). 
 
Also the above mentioned Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have had a great 
influence on posthumanist thought. In their two-volume work Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, they critique psychoanalysis and Marxism in Anti-Oedipus to move 
on to creating their own conceptual apparatus and philosophy of science in A 
Thousand Plateaus. The nomadology they start exploring, is of interest here partly 
since both Rosi Braidotti and Manuel Delanda have continued to build on Deleuze 
and Guattari's work. (Hultman 2012b, 89-90.) 
 
Posthumanism does not completely break with post-structuralism but goes further 
towards a different position (Åsberg et al. 2012, 30). One important aspect is the 
critique of social constructivism. Even though posthumanists appreciate the work 
done on the discursive and world forming aspects of language, they perceive social 
constructionism to be a form of reductionism, by reducing almost everything to 
human sociality. (Åsberg et al. 2012, 30.) The focus on materiality, not language, is 
the first and most obvious difference between them. Åsberg et al. (2012, 29; my 
translation) even describes posthumanism as the “[t]heories and methods which take 
over after social constructionism, but at the same time both include and transcend 
post-structuralist insights”. Posthumanists are saying, yes, language is performative, 
but matter can also create discursive meaning. 
 
Another possible beginning for posthumanism is the Macy conferences in 
cybernetics of the late nineteen forties and early fifties and the invention of systems 
theory (Wolfe 2010, xii). Indeed, the Macy conferences could be viewed as one start 
of posthumanism and is certainly interesting from the perspective of communication 
studies. In fact, Hayles argues that cybernetics was in part responsible for shaping the 
perceived disembodiment of media (Brown 2010, 55). Cybernetics opens up to a 
view of the body, both non-human and human, as a medium since these bodies have 
the ability for “storing, transmitting and processing information” (Hayles 2010, 148). 
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The argument goes that due to technology, making the nature-culture distinction 
obsolete, cybernetics helps one to envision hybrids by treating humans and machines 
equally (Hayles 2010, 153). However, the cybernetic aim for control brings ones 
thoughts more to a hierarchical and anthropocentric line of thinking instead of the 
binary challenging post-anthropocentric posthumanism. The upgrading of humans to 
the level of the machine and the will for a “life-enhancing, life-affirming future” 
(Hayles 2010, 155) reminds one more of transhumanism than posthumanism. Still, 
Lummaa and Rojala, by leaning on Wolfe, mention it as a beginning for 
posthumanism (2014, 14-15). The role of cybernetics for the figure of the 
posthuman, however, is not something I would contest and the posthuman and 
posthumanism is obviously closely linked.   
 
The next section will go through two disciplines where the emerging of 
posthumanism is especially prominent. The two fields are gender studies, where 
feminist materialisms have opened the door for new materialism and posthumanism 
and science and technology studies where actor-network theory has been an actor for 
more than twenty years. (Åsberg 2012a, 7.) Since many of the scholars do 
interdisciplinary work, I have chosen to discuss a few of their theories labelled under 
their names, not their theories. Except for the thinker presented below there are many 
others that should be mentioned as well, like Annemarie Mol, Jane Bennett, 
Elisabeth Grosz, Quentin Meillassoux and Michael Serres to name a few.   
 
2.3 Posthumanism and gender studies 
 
Questions of identity, representation and recognition has kept feminists busy for 
years but during the last decade work with non-human perspectives as well as “the 
ontological status of the social” has increased in gender studies (Åsberg 2012a, 7-8).  
Even though materiality and matter has been “awakened” in many disciplines, it is 
especially present in gender studies. Feminist theorizing beyond the “linguistic turn” 
or in the “material turn” goes by several names, from feminist materialisms to 
material feminism. The interdisciplinarity of this turn is easily observable by looking 
at the frontrunners in this new materialist feminist theory. To name a few influential 
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ones; Donna Haraway with a background in biology, Karen Barad coming from 
physics and quantum theory and Rosi Braidotti in continental philosophy. The 
examples work to demonstrate the difficulty in a clear categorization of them. These 
three thinkers will be shortly presented below.     
 
One of the more influential thinkers and pioneers for the formation of posthumanism 
is Donna Haraway. Her concepts during the last 30 years have made an impact on 
how science, biology as well as communication and power relations are regarded. 
“One could call her texts on the cyborg and on situated knowledge ground breaking 
pioneer work, where the cyborg figure offers an inter-woven hybrid and process 
ontological understanding of nature and culture as intimately and inseparably inter-
woven.” (Åsberg 2012b, 48; my translation.) Haraway’s definition of a cyborg is “a 
cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality 
as well as a creature of fiction" (Haraway 1985, 7). As Kathrine Hayles (2006, 159-
160) points out, what was somewhat shocking then, "that the human body would be 
modified with cyber-mechanical devices" is in the light of the networked, wired and 
implanted society not so foreign anymore. The cyborg worked back then to 
symbolize both advanced technology, military mobilizations as well as capitalism, 
but today it “is not networked enough” (Hayles 2006, 159). 
 
Haraway might agree with that analysis, since after the cyborg she has continued to 
provoke by deconstructing things we take for granted. Haraway has moved on from 
the cyborg to companion species, which she calls a sibling of the cyborg (Haraway 
2003). The figuration companion species is a way to show how the taken for granted 
categories of “human” and “animal” are not “natural” but created by language. By 
using the word companion species, Haraway aims to show that those categories only 
exist through our anthropocentric language, by pointing at how different companion 
species co-constitute each other and are co-becoming together. (Åsberg et al. 2012, 
35.) “Companion species is a concept that for Haraway shows how the partners 
cannot pre-exist the meeting, since the process of their becoming happens in it” 
(Åsberg 2012b, 52; my translation). Relationality is, as the above quote shows, an 
important aspect in posthumanist theory and figuration can be used as a method as it 
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aims to operate “by revealing the underlying assumptions of specific discourses and 
showing the ways in which these discourses fail or contradict themselves” (Bastian 
2006, 1030).                                                          
 
Another important concept by Haraway, is technoscience. It points to how closely 
linked capitalism, science, and technology are. Technoscience works as a biopolitical 
apparatus, the "apparatus of bodily production", creating different material and 
discursive subjectivities. (Åsberg 2012b, 49.) The most important of Haraway's 
concepts for the theory formation of posthumanism is naturecultures, which will be 
treated more in detail in Chapter Three. Haraway's cyborg can be viewed as one of 
the first examples of her forthcoming naturecultures, which then was developed later 
on, as it needs to be studied both materially and semiotically (Åsberg 2012b, 48). 
 
While Haraway combines biology and feminism, Karen Barad works with a mix of 
quantum theory and feminist theory. One of her main concepts, posthumanist 
performativity, is closer to social sciences than physics, even though her background 
is in the natural sciences. (Hultman 2012a, 73.) Barad starts building from Austin's 
speech act theory, Butler's performativity and Foucault's discursive practices to 
continue on a path without them. A performative understanding of discursive 
practices for Barad (2003, 802) “challenges the representationalist belief in the 
power of words to represent pre-existing things”. This take on representationalism 
makes her interesting for media and communication studies as well. What makes 
Barad's take on performativity special is how she views matter: 
 
“Performativity, properly construed, is not an invitation to turn everything (including 
material bodies) into words; on the contrary, performativity is precisely a 
contestation of the excessive power granted to language to determine what is real. 
[...] performativity is actually a contestation of the unexamined habits of mind that 
grant language and other forms of representation more power in determining our 
ontologies than they deserve.” (Barad 2003, 802)   
 
This view on performativity is not a mainstream reading, but a reading that sums up 
the posthumanist relationship to social constructionism very well, hence the name 
posthumanist performativity. Will keeping the same approach, that we perform what 
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we are, Barad adds on matter to see how materiality is an important part in how we 
make and hold up different phenomena. Barad also asks how come it is that “we 
believe that there is a possibility to have a direct access to cultural representations 
and their content, but not the “things” represented” (Hultman 2012a, 77; my 
translation)? Unlike Haraway, and others, Barad does not seem hesitant to take upon 
the title posthumanist for her theory. 
 
Barad partly also creates her own terminology, and important for her work is both the 
theory of agential realism and concept of intra-action. The post-constructionist theory 
agential realism combines ontology and epistemology to make sense of the world as 
“material-semiotic phenomena” or in other words as intra-actions (Åsberg et al. 
2012, 201). Intra-action, instead of interaction points to the co-constitutive aspects of 
different phenomena. It is a relational ontological theory to describe how different 
actors, both human and non-human, become in their intra-action. Intra-action aims to 
challenge pre-existing sovereign individuals and instead see how different 
phenomena are taking place, that they are “not a thing, but a doing” (Barad 2003, 
822). As Barad works with quantum theory and feminist theory, she could be 
criticized for going too casually from scientific results on subatomic scales to 
ontological claims about social and political phenomena which is not an 
uncontroversial leap.  
 
In a perhaps more common interdisciplinary fashion, Rosi Braidotti combines gender 
studies and continental philosophy, taking a lot of inspiration from Deleuze. In her 
book, The Posthuman (2013), Braidotti shows why posthumanism is something very 
close to feminist studies: “the human is a normative convention, which does not 
make it inherently negative, just highly regulatory and hence instrumental to 
practices of exclusion and domination“ (Braidotti 2013, 26). Reasons why a 
normative convention of “the human” is excluding and restricting can be found 
deeply rooted in humanism. The ideal for the perfect human being goes back at least 
five hundred years to the Renaissance and it is based on Leonardo da Vinci's 
Vitruvian Man (a drawing where the proportions of the ideal body is sketched) 
(Braidotti 2013, 13). Besides being a man, the universal rational human has a few 
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other characteristics; he is white, European and able-bodied (Braidotti 2013, 24). 
None of the above is new critique: “the Vitruvian ideal of Man as the standard of 
both perfection and perfectibility was literally pulled down from his pedestal and 
deconstructed” by antihumanists like Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser (Braidotti 
2013, 23) who challenged to the core of what humanism is built on. 
 
Both Rosi Braidotti and her colleagues Iris van der Tuin and Cecilia Åsberg have in 
several texts suggested posthumanism and new materialism as tools for gender 
studies. In the articles “Beyond the Humanist Imagination” and “Posthumanities is a 
Feminist Issue” Åsberg et al. (2011b) argue not only why posthumanism is a feminist 
issue but also for a more posthumanist and less anthropocentric view of the world: 
 
“As humans become more entangled in intricate relationships with technology and 
science, with other animals and the environment, notions of the human, along with 
various humanisms and anthropocentric approaches, have become difficult to uphold. 
The pervasiveness of these entanglements also fundamentally threatens the humanist 
logics of gender and race, sexuality and species, and their related dichotomous 
understanding of selfhood and otherness, internal and external, familiar and alien, 
natural and constructed.” (Åsberg et al. 2011a; my italics) 
 
The quote indicates how posthumanism is a feminist issue, and that it can collect 
many fields and studies under its name, pointing at how different hierarchies are 
interlinked. It also points at how the identities and power relations important for 
gender studies is embedded in humanism. For Braidotti, the deconstruction of the 
human subject is one of the core tasks for feminism. However, the posthumanist 
feminist project does not make everyone happy. One critique towards it is that when 
women finally start getting “human status” and a political subjectivity, ironically a 
huge project to deconstruct the human subject is started. (Åsberg 2012c, 105.) 
 
Yet the feminist posthumanist project (many times combined with post-colonial and 
ecological thinkers) seems to be taking quite a revolutionary direction. The 
combination of the posthuman, post-anthropocentric and material feminism seem to 
be a step towards, once more, trying to get rid of the normative Vitruvian man and 
through him a set of normative and oppressive mechanisms. The difference this time 
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is that it is done by questioning the ground he stands on, instead of trying to become 
his equal. 
 
As in gender studies, the posthumanist thought has been especially present in science 
and technology studies. This is partly due to Bruno Latour and his fellow theorists of 
actor-network-theory. The next subchapter will look into their ideas. 
 
2.4 Posthumanism in science and technology studies 
 
In 1988, Bruno Latour, under the pseudonym Jim Johnson, suggests that sociologists 
should study a door-closer as a social non-human actor. Latour (Johnson) argues that 
if an automatic door-closer would not be there, the work it is doing would have to be 
done by a human. Therefore, it is an (f)actor that influences and alters human 
behaviour, which should be studied along with humans. 
 
An automatic door-closer is only one example of how we interact with objects, 
things and non-humans. To make non-human actors become more visible and 
imaginable, Latour follows the “evolution” of the door, all the way from the first 
invention of doors to the electric door-closer. (Latour 1988, 299.) This example 
presented above concerns something built by humans and a non-human actor does 
not always have to be that. For example, storms like a tornado or a viral virus are 
good examples of how something that is not created by human technology can 
become an important actor in human society. Yet again, the electric door-opener as 
well as the original door are things built by humans. Going back to the start of 
existence of doors, it could be argued that they are not separate, non-human actors, 
but instead very much associated with humans. The point is not, however, to find 
non-human actors that are completely untouched or unaffected by humans, instead 
the border between what is nature, culture, and what is nature and society is viewed 
as irrelevant, since what we actually have is a mish-mash of them, called 
naturecultures (see Chapter Three). 
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One of the most known of Latour's projects that he has developed together with John 
Law and Michel Callon is actor-network theory, ANT. Actor-network theory 
continues to build upon that mish-mash and it asks how objects and materiality are 
part of creating the social. Humans, non-humans and objects are all actors in 
extensive networks where, according to Latour, Law and Callon, all actors are 
equally important. Every actor is also a network in itself. All of the actors in an 
actor-network also affect each other, if one actor is changed the whole network is 
changed. (Lee 2012, 147.)  
 
Law locates ANT as part of the “family of material-semiotic tools” and he points out 
that despite the name, actor-network theory is not a theory per se, but “a toolkit for 
telling interesting stories” about webs of relations between different human and non-
human actors and how they assemble or not. (Law 2009, 141-142.) The name itself, 
actor-network theory was coined by Michel Callon but Law notes that there is not 
anything like one actor network theory and “it” is similar if not the same as material-
semiotics (Haraway) and Deleuze’s concept of assemblage (2009, 142, 146). One of 
the main problems behind and for ANT is how to make sense of both “socially and 
materially heterogeneous systems” (ibid.)? In other words how one can trace and 
explain the material processes that take part of creating the social. 
 
What this material-semiotic actor-network could look like is summed up by Latour in 
this long sentence about the ozone holes in the Earth's atmosphere: 
 
“Let one of the representatives talk, for instance, about the ozone hole, another 
represent Monsanto chemical industry, a third the workers of the same chemical 
industry, another the voters of New Hampshire, a fifth the meteorology of the polar 
regions; let still another speak in the name of the State; what does is matter, so long 
as they are all talking about the same thing, about a quasi-object they have all 
created, the object-discourse-nature-society whose new properties astound us all and 
whose network extends from my refrigerator to the Antarctic by way of chemistry, 
law, the State, the economy, and satellites.“ (Latour 1993, 144) 
 
In the quote above one can see how geography, economics, politics, chemistry, 
meteorology, capitalist logic, food, laws, unions, states and representative 
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democracies all are needed to get a grip about what is really going on when one is 
talking about ozone holes. Actor-network theorists are asking how one could deal 
with a problem like the ozone hole by only looking at one aspect of it. 
 
Actor-network theorists argue that to explain different phenomena by saying that 
they are social systems is not enough: “the social has never explained anything; the 
social has to be explained instead” (Latour 2005, 97). The critique is that by claiming 
that society is the answer to a question, one forgets to ask what society actually is. 
Concepts like class or patriarchy for example do not only work as explanations, but 
they are also effects of something that needs to be explained (Law 2009, 147). “That 
is not to say that they are not real – they may indeed be made real in practice – but 
they offer no framework for explanation” (Law 2009, 147). What does patriarchy 
consists of, how is it formed and materialized? In other words, arriving at the end 
station of explanation by arguing the social as the reason does not go far enough for 
them. This of course is provocative to argue in the social and political sciences. 
 
Latour (1993, 54) is thanking the Edinburgh School of Social Studies of Science for 
starting the collapse of the separation of nature and culture as clear distinct 
categories. By taking theories and methods designed for social sciences and using 
them on natural sciences, the Edinburgh School bumped into something they could 
not predict. By trying to ingest the natural sciences in the social sciences, they got in 
over their head and the project collapsed along with the dualisms. For their 
experiment to work, “society had to produce everything arbitrarily including the 
cosmic order, biology, chemistry, and the laws of physics”. (Latour 1993, 55.) With 
the impossibility of the above quote revealing for the researchers, they realized that 
both sciences are needed, and not only for the hard parts of society but also for the 
soft. “The double position of objects and society had to be entirely rethought” 
(Latour 1993, 55) along with social theory. 
 
This chapter has tried to define posthumanism and distinguish it from other lines of 
thinking, which are using the similar terminology, like transhumanism. It has 
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provided a short history of posthumanism as well as discussed current posthumanist 
thinkers working in the fields of gender studies and science and technology studies.  
Due to the width of the topic the above is only a scratch on the surface, but 
nonetheless necessary to be able to go further and deeper into certain theories. Many 
of the theories are controversial and the posthumanist scholars cannot try to turn 
almost everything upside down without strong objections. Despite the promising new 
theory there is something alarming in the messianic aspects of posthumanism, and a 
danger of merely just creating new grand narratives, even though one is trying to get 
rid of old ones. In something so broad, what will really happen when taking these 
things from the ontological level to a more concrete one is still quite unclear. Also 
posthumanist methodologies are still under development. That said, it should be 
noted that posthumanism is a very young turn, still constantly forming and changing. 
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3. Post-anthropocentrism and nature-culture 
 
While the aspirations for Chapter Two were to look at posthumanism from a broad 
perspective and to define it, this chapter will dive deeper into the theory. This will be 
done by looking at what is left when one gets rid of anthropocentrism, as well as the 
supposed border between nature and culture. First post-anthropocentrism will be 
explored, partly through the work of Rosi Braidotti, then the concept of 
naturecultures, coined by Donna Haraway and then Bruno Latour's take on the same 
continuum. 
 
Anthropocentrism is the disposition to give humans and the human subject an 
unreasonably large part in explanations and theories about the world. Because of its 
harsh critique of anthropocentrism, posthumanism can give the impression of 
threatening the humanistic institutions, which are already under heavy pressure and 
fighting for their existence. That is not the point, instead it could perhaps be viewed 
as a critical self-reflexive project. Posthumanism wants to acknowledge different 
ways of understandings of ontology, agency and materiality (Åsberg 2012a, 8).  
 
Leaving an anthropocentric perspective behind is an important aspect of 
posthumanism, for which humanism is, naturally and thoroughly anthropocentric. 
Åsberg points out that humanism is not universal or neutral, but can instead be 
understood as ideology. It is creating the discourse of the human as a generic, 
autonomous and rational being with free will, "an abstraction without nationality, 
gender, sexual orientation, age or handicap" (Åsberg 2012a, 9). Louis Althusser and 
Foucault, among other antihumanists, have harshly critiqued humanism for that. 
Frantz Fanon has critiqued humanism as means of European cultural imperialism. 
(Åsberg 2012a, 8-9.) These “universal” categories, in their turn make discrimination 
and hierarchies based on them possible. Posthumanism aims to question the same 
anthropocentrism as the antihumanists, as well as to take material and physical 
surroundings seriously.  In other words, posthumanism wants to step out of the still 
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prevailing anthropocentrism and rethink the world. That means trying to think 
without having the human as the main focus, turning away from Anthropos. The 
perspective of post- or non-anthropocentrism is pervasive in posthumanism. Even 
though we cannot get rid of ourselves and our thinking, which is not the aim anyway, 
our societies and sciences are built for humans. The core raison d'être of 
posthumanism is questioning the analytical ability of humanism, in an attempt to 
reach further, to things that are missing in that philosophical tradition. Things that are 
present but mostly absent, like animals, trees or minerals. With the perspective of 
post-anthropocentrism, posthumanist thinkers want to intervene in the humanist 
project: 
 
“[T]he humanist-rationalist project has at the same time both succeeded above 
expectations as it has failed with catastrophic consequences. The trust of the human 
in its own species-specific abilities and skills as well as its tendency to position itself 
above the needs of other beings has created high technology and huge problems. 
Posthumanism is a reaction and answer to this experience”. (Lummaa & Rojola 
2014, 13; my translation) 
 
Ewa Domanska notes that non-anthropocentric research would not aim to erase the 
human completely but ”to displace the human subject from the centre” (2010, 121) 
of many studies. In academia, new studies like animal studies or plant studies are 
growing. It is also visible through changes inside other studies or the different 
disciplines and the research interests in them, through a growing interest in 
materiality, embodiment and nonhumans.   
 
3.1.2 Defining Anthropocentrism 
 
There are at least two ways of approaching a definition of anthropocentrism. It is 
seldom clear which of the two is aimed at when the concept is mentioned. The use of 
the word anthropocentrism in this thesis will be referring to both of them, which 
seems to be the prevalent practice in other texts. These two definitions are frequently 
interlinked but still different. The first one is more of a moral value argument, where 
human beings are considered more important and superior than other animals, the 
“anthropocentric idea that the only bodies that matter are human” (Braidotti 2008, 
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183). The second can be categorized as an approach to the world, seeing it from the 
perspective of human needs and norms. Here Domanska's definition of 
anthropocentrism once again illustrates how the problems with anthropocentrism and 
humanism are the same: “the human species as the centre of the world, enjoying 
hegemony over other beings and functioning as masters of a nature which exists to 
serve its needs” (Domanska 2010, 118). 
 
In a similar fashion Rob Boddice notes that anthropocentrism can be defined in two 
ways, as “a charge of human chauvinism” or as a view of “human ontological 
borders”. Yet, even though this anthropocentrism is crumbling in many disciplines it 
has still “provided order and structure to humans’ understanding of the world, while 
unavoidably expressing the limits of that understanding” (Boddice 2011, 1). While 
anthropocentrism as an ideal has been critiqued already a long time ago, it is still 
partly present and difficult to get rid of completely, if not impossible.   
 
Richie Nimmo (2011, 60) suggests why postmodernism is not enough in 
deconstructing anthropocentrism: “all modern discourses can be understood as 
discourses of humanity, so that to be modern is to have a human-centred view of the 
universe”. Bruno Latour would agree, and partly therefore he is stating that “we have 
never been modern”. For a critique of that human-centred view, Nimmo decides to 
use the word humanism for his critique instead of the word anthropocentrism. 
According to Nimmo few would want to label themselves anthropocentric, unlike 
humanists which is perceived as a positive label and therefore used. 
 
One of the corner stones in this humanism and anthropocentrism is the subject-object 
division of humans and non-humans. Humans are seen as subject, while non-humans 
are seen as objects. Even though this division, as well as the body-mind dualism of 
Rene Descartes, has been exposed to extensive critique, Nimmo reminds us that they 
are still very much at work. He even claims that “these divisions constitute the 
architecture of modern knowledge“. (Nimmo 2011, 62.) A post-anthropocentric 
standpoint rejects this subject-object division, and acknowledges that non-humans 
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also are subjects. The standpoint also goes one step further and rejects the 
human/non-human division. (Nimmo 2011, 60-64.) 
 
The point made by critics of anthropocentrism is that it leads to the domination and 
discrimination of humans and non-humans. One important aspect of the critique of 
anthropocentrism is that it is not only a critique of human supremacy but also of its 
exclusion of all human others. Anthropocentrism brings with issues regarding who is 
considered a normal human, which has impact on many living bodies of different 
genders, races as well as persons with different bodily formations/embodiment. 
Therefore anthropocentrism (and humanism) has been attacked previously by for 
example gender studies, post-colonial theory and antihumanist thinkers. Partly 
through a more technological world, and through a more posthuman world, the 
anthropocentric viewpoint has started to crumble even more. This post-
anthropocentrism is working towards the goal that ”things, plants and nonhuman 
animals should also be incorporated into history as something other than passive 
recipients of human actions” (Domanska 2010, 122). 
 
The posthumanist switch in interest away from Anthropos can be named in different 
ways, historian Ewa Domanska talks about a non-anthropocentric paradigm (2010, 
118) and Rosi Braidotti talks about a post-anthropocentric turn (2013). Whether one 
likes to call it anti-anthropocentrism, non-anthropocentrism or post-anthropocentrism 
the main point is to direct ones energy away from humans. The aim is of course not 
the elimination of the human but the elimination of the human as the centre of 
everything. This position should not be misunderstood as misanthropy either. 
 
3.1.3 Braidotti's post-anthropocentrism 
 
The word used in this thesis will join the ever growing amount of “posts”, and follow 
Rosi Braidotti in her use of the term post-anthropocentrism, instead of using non-
anthropocentrism. The reason for this is the posthumanist notion that one is already 
beyond Anthropos, in a brake with humanism and anthropocentrism, being different 
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from it but not necessarily in opposition to it. That is also how post-anthropocentrism 
differs from antihumanism: 
 
“while the antihumanists  actively set out to overturn the hegemony of 
anthropocentrism, posthumanists begin with the recognition that ‘Man’ is (always) 
already a falling or fallen figure. What this means is that posthumanism often tends 
to take humanism’s waning or disappearance as something of a given.” (Badmington 
2006b, 240-201, quoted in Herbrechter 2013, 44)  
 
As stated above, critique of anthropocentrism and humanism is not a new thing.  One 
of the paths leading to posthumanism is antihumanism even though that is neither 
“logically necessary or historically inevitable” (Braidotti 2013, 25).  Yet, the 
movement of antihumanism and the work done by the antihumanist has had an 
impact in forming what is now called posthumanism. Radical thinkers in the 60s and 
70s rejected both liberalist humanism and Marxist humanism turning towards 
antihumanism. The French intellectuals had a special position, attracting thinkers to 
work with critical theory. (Braidotti 2013, 19.) The work that was done in the name 
of antihumanism and the thinkers of antihumanist critical theory became better 
known under the name of post-structuralism. These academics took a new route and 
“stepped out of the dialectical oppositional thinking” and chose “a third way to deal 
with changing understandings of human subjectivity”. (Braidotti 2013, 23.) 
 
It was a time of strong feminist and post-colonial critique of the humanist Man, as 
the point of departure for “everything”. The normative universalist assumption of the 
Vitruvian man, by Leonardo da Vinci, as the ideal of a human being was questioned 
and deconstructed, “an entire philosophical generation called for insubordination 
from received humanist ideas of 'human nature'”. (Braidotti 2013, 23-24.) By 
questioning human nature and seeing it as a social construct a lot of new possibilities 
opened up. The human, meaning the white, European, male did not get to persist 
unquestioned as the norm. Already Foucault made that very clear in The Order of 
Things: 
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“To all those who still wish to talk about man, about his reign or his liberation, to all 
those who still ask themselves questions about what man is in his essence,  to all 
those who wish to take him as their starting-point in their attempts to reach the truth, 
to all those who, on the other hand, refer all knowledge back to the truths of man 
himself [...] we can answer only with a philosophical laugh – which means, to a 
certain extent, a silent one.” (Foucault 1977, 342-343) 
 
The importance of the critical work by antihumanism for posthumanism seems quite 
clear but as Braidotti (2013, 25) points out it is just one route and does not 
necessarily have to lead to posthumanism. Why is then posthumanism claiming to 
bring something new to the table, when these thoughts are 50 years old? 
Antihumanists realized that the normative aspects of the human, which they viewed 
as a semiotic construction, worked to exclude the sexualized, racialized and 
naturalized. Antihumanism still stayed, contradictory, inside the realm of the human.  
The two clear differences would be that posthumanism is focusing on non-humans to 
a much greater extent as well as the turn away from language to materiality. These 
differences bring with an analysis of the real consequences these discourses have on 
bodies and the complexity in changing that:  
 
“The emphasis falls therefore on the difficulty of erasing the trace of the epistemic 
violence by which a non-humanist position might be carved out of the institutions of 
Humanism. The acknowledgement of epistemic violence goes hand in hand with the 
recognition of the real-life violence which was and still is practised against non-
human animals and the dehumanized social and political 'others ' of the humanist 
norm.” (Braidotti 2013, 30) 
 
The quote shows the post-anthropocentric political aim for all living beings. Even 
though one can picture more easily the emancipatory project for the human “other”, 
what also should be remembered is that this post-anthropocentric turn very much 
involves non-humans in all aspects, not only animals. Without diving into the 
philosophical debates on anthropocentrism too much, since it has been critiqued and 
discussed for years, this chapter will focus on what is emerging and developing out 
of that critique. 
 
Rosi Braidotti approaches the topic through a discussion on the posthuman and post-
anthropocentrism. For her the important questions are “what understandings of 
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contemporary subjectivity and subject-formation are enabled by a post-
anthropocentric approach? What comes after the anthropocentric subject?” (Braidotti 
2013, 58). According to Braidotti, to tackle these questions one has to look into 
biopower and how contemporary capitalism functions. Since the subjectivity 
explored by antihumanists also is at work for capitalism, which is profiting from the 
hybrids, that subjectivity does not bring one beyond the logic of capital. ”Global 
technoscience companies produced exactly the hybrids celebrated by antihumanists, 
which fits perfectly into the manuscript for global capitalism” (Lummaa & Rojola 
2014, 27; my translation). That would be one reason for an antihumanist to move on 
to posthumanism. 
 
Since life in itself is being commodified, capitalized and traded to an all the time 
greater extent, the political economy of life is a tool of analysis for looking at post-
anthropocentric worlds. Different bio-technological projects, as well as the Human 
Genome project, are examples of how advanced capitalism is trading everything that 
lives. (Braidotti 2013, 59-60.) This is also visible in places such as the illegal market, 
where animals are the third largest sector, “after drugs and arms but ahead of 
women” (Braidotti 2013, 70). Apart from the good enough reasons of getting rid of 
anthropocentric domination and exclusion, Braidotti's argument is simple, since 
capitalism already works in a post-anthropocentric way, “it ultimately unifies all 
species under the imperative of the market” (Braidotti 2013, 63), then our analysis of 
it should have a post-anthropocentric perspective, one that includes all of those 
species. 
 
Braidotti's take on the ability for objects to act is based on a view of matter as 
autopoetic, self-organizing. Matter self-organizes through informational codes as a 
part of larger organic systems, and therefore matter can function as non-human actors 
(Braidotti 2013, 59-61). Everything from life to economy and society can be 
understood as “flows of information moving through the biosphere and contributes in 
creating a pattern in matter-energy-flows” (Palmås 2011, 12-13). According to 
Braidotti (2013, 61) “the informational power of matter itself”, is what the global 
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market economy is investing in and competing for. “The relational capacity of the 
posthuman subject is not confined within our species, […] Living matter – including 
the flesh – is intelligent and self-organizing, but it is so precisely because it is not 
disconnected from the rest of organic life” (Braidotti 2013, 60). This is one reason 
why Braidotti suggests moving outside of the social constructionist perspective and 
starting to look at material aspects of life. Leaning on Deleuzian Spinozist vitalism 
and Guattarian ecologies Braidotti draws up something she calls zoe-centered 
egalitarianism. Zoe, as opposed to bios, “refers to the endless vitality of life as a 
process of continuous becoming” (Braidotti 2008, 182). It is a way for Braidotti to 
include all aspects of life, not only life in the polis. The idea is, that through the 
generative force of zoe, one can reach trans-species egalitarianism. This vitalist 
approach to posthumanism will not be looked further into here, even though the 
question of equality between species is of importance. 
 
3.1.4 Operating objects and machines   
 
Human anthropocentrism and a will to leave it behind can be problematized from 
many directions. Philosopher Giorgio Agamben's concept of the anthropological 
machine is one concept that should be mentioned in the context of this study as well 
as how object-oriented ontology handles anthropocentrism.  
 
Agamben's anthropological machine functions through recognition. Since humans 
are able to and have to recognize themselves as humans, a state that is always already 
pre-given, what is at play is not so much creation, but a self-sustaining mechanism 
functioning as “a machine or device for producing the recognition of the human”. 
(Agamben 2004, 26.) The ability to recognize oneself is according to Agamben a 
main feature of the human, and he shows that it has historically been so by going 
back to Linnaeus and others. In an extremely non-posthumanistic fashion Agamben 
states that the difference between man and animal is language, which in itself is not 
always already present. Instead humans enter into language. (2004, 36.) Humans are 
produced “through the opposition man/animal, human/inhuman” and they are always 
“already presupposed” (2004, 37). In other words, by performing the human, we are 
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at the same time shaping what it perceived to be the animal, even though Agamben 
argues that it is a pre-given state.  
 
The posthumanist will to get rid of anthropocentrism is not enough for everyone. 
From the same side of the ontological turn, the speculative realists or object-oriented 
ontologists Levy Bryant, Tim Morton and Ian Bogost have critiqued posthumanism 
for being too human centred (Lummaa 2014, 266). In their ontology, the subject is 
left out, and interaction happens among objects. The object-oriented ontologists 
manage to rethink the position of the human completely, as an object among other 
objects, not giving them a special position.  
 
It can also be questioned if it even is possible for humans to get rid of our 
anthropocentrism as well as the aspect that the theorizing around it of course is done 
by humans. One critique of antihumanism as well as posthumanism is partly how 
anthropocentric the aim to overcome it is, “as if the 'end' of Humanism might be 
subjected to human control, as if we bear the capacity to erase the traces of 
Humanism from either the present or an imagined future” (Peterson 2011, 128 
quoted in Braidotti 2013, 20). Is it just one hypocritical move to get rid of one’s bad 
self-conscious? Is there a way out, or are all human views anthropocentric? Still that 
is not the most important point here, if the human can be “pure” in this way.  
 
How many of us humans are looking at the world through anthropocentric glasses 
can even sometimes be difficult to realize but something we might have to. Since we 
live in a finite space together with many different beings, animals as well as plants 
and there is limited access to food and clean water. In our ecosystem, most living and 
non-living things have their place and function, it is not strange that post-
anthropocentrism often is discussed in relation to something like climate change or 
animal studies. Living in a geological era popularly called the Anthropocene, in 
which the human species is viewed as a geological force, it becomes somewhat 
evident that we are dependent of each other. 
 
 
 
41 
3.2 Nature - culture 
 
This subchapter will discuss the nature-culture divide from two different 
posthumanist perspectives. The concepts of nature and culture are hardly undebated, 
but as Vicky Kirby (2008, 215) puts it, their borders are also “routinely overlooked”, 
which means that the whole “conceptual apparatus” that comes along with the 
concepts, is to be put under scrutiny. This means criticism from several directions, 
from gender studies and science and technology studies among others, challenging 
the Cartesian subject as well as the political aspect of the dichotomy of nature and 
culture itself. (Kirby 2008, 215.)   
 
The divide between two separately perceived categories, belonging to two different 
spheres and being mutually exclusive, is not an apolitical divide. With the help of the 
concepts of nature and culture, as sort of a backbone in our thinking, we make sense 
of the world and create our views on what exist and what does not, “who and what 
are in the world is precisely what is at stake” (Haraway 2003, 8). The dichotomy of 
culture and nature is a divide that shapes how we perceive things like the human 
body, academia and even the whole planet. According to theorists like Donna 
Haraway and Bruno Latour this dichotomy is not completely waterproof. 
 
The intensification of the split between nature and culture, partly through the split of 
the body and the mind, can be traced back to the Renaissance, the Enlightenment 
philosophers and the rise of humanism and naturally, through that, the focus on the 
human (Latimer & Miele 2013, 6). After Descartes’s analysis of knowledge, one 
premise for modern philosophy has been the duality between body and mind 
(Hatfield 2015). Although the division between nature and culture is more of a broad 
pattern of thinking and the split between body and mind is an explicit theory, the 
latter lends its support to the former. If mind and body are separate and the mind 
exists as a different substance than the substance of nature, it means that culture as a 
product of the mind also is separate from nature. This gap between mind and body, 
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human consciousness and the rest of the world lays as a foundation for both how 
human minds and the “rest” often is theorized in academia. Even the division of 
natural and social sciences shows how great this divide is. 
 
The word nature and the meaning of it is not a simple thing to define. The literature 
critic Raymond Williams explains that the words culture and especially nature are 
the most complex words in English language (Williams 1988, 87; 219). Nature could 
be defined through breaking it down into three categories, in which nature could be 
interpreted as external, intrinsic and universal. External nature is the environment, 
intrinsic nature is the “essential characteristics of a thing” and universal nature is 
aspects like natural laws, which regulates the universe. (Ginn & Demeritt 2009, 301.) 
 
When discussing or using the word nature all three of the meanings are often used. 
Already just viewing nature as a concept, not an “empirical domain of geographic 
study” can be controversial (Ginn & Demeritt 2009, 308). According to Ginn and 
Demeritt, Marx was one of the first to suggest that nature would be a human-made 
concept when he was talking about a second nature. Also feminist critique of how the 
concept of nature and the nature-culture binary has been voiced for a long time. 
Feminist scholars have pointed out how the notion of “natural” is used to justify 
gender oppression and discrimination, like how it is viewed to be the biological 
nature of women to do laundry, cook food or be bad at math. (Ginn & Demeritt 2009, 
304-305.) In posthumanist theory, the words culture, society, social and politics are 
frequently and problematically used as synonyms, here the word culture will always 
be used, unless the author discussed clearly only uses e.g. society.   
 
The geographers Castree and MacMillan (2001, 209) takes us through the arguments 
on nature and culture and how they are perceived. In the 1980s geographers claimed 
that ”nature” is created by humans, ”we can only know nature through culturally 
specific systems of meaning and signification” (ibid). The point is not that nothing 
would not exist outside human culture but that nature is always interpreted through 
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language or culture, just like any representation of nature. This leads to a situation 
where, logically, humans cannot step out of culture to interpret something like pure 
nature, which would be ideal in natural sciences. Another argument in relation to 
nature and culture is how the image or view of nature is used as a ”tool of power” 
(ibid.) helping to upkeep the ”relations of cultural and economic dominance in 
society” (ibid.) and how the distinction between nature and culture is very affective 
in organizing and shaping our imaginations. 
 
The arguments made, for this view on nature (and culture) have pointed at the 
”intellectual incoherence of imagining nature as essentially non-social ” but have 
also brought with a ”political weaponry to attack the dubious invocation of 'nature' as 
a separate domain to which appeals can be made to legitimate existing or new 
economic, social and ecological arrangements”. Examples of how this appeal to 
nature is used are arguments like these two made up examples; “two persons of the 
same gender cannot be romantically involved, that is unnatural” or “humans are 
inherently greedy by nature, hence an equal world is not possible”. When the appeal 
to nature is used for political projects with oppressive consequences, a non-dualistic 
view of nature and culture shakes up that appeal to nature. 
 
While aiming for an understanding of nature and culture which would not place them 
as binaries, Castree and MacMillan claim that these, which they call “social 
constructionist“ arguments, viewing nature as unsocial but always interpreted 
through culture, have an important place but nevertheless does not manage to move 
away from the nature-culture dichotomy. That is however something that Castree and 
MacMillan are aiming at, for the same reasons as mentioned above. The point of 
these arguments, are according to Castree and MacMillan “only reinstating the 
dichotomy” since it only “shifts the casual but ontological arrows from one 'side' of 
the social-natural dichotomy to the other” (2001, 210). Instead, they argue, the 
dialectic way of looking at the relationship between nature and society only makes 
the divide stronger (2001, 210). 
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For a number of reasons, Castree and MacMillan suggest looking into ANT for a 
third way to apprehend nature and culture. First of all, we could then start looking for 
quasi-objects (or hybrids) but also see their relationality. This relationality leads us to 
more posthumanist networks. These hybrid networks show how we need both the 
cultural and the natural to map the network, and that they are in fact co-constitutive 
in relation to each other. (Castree & MacMillan 2001, 211-213.) 
 
For the next part of this chapter, theory on the continuum of nature and culture will 
be explored, here with the help of Donna Haraway and Bruno Latour. Haraway and 
Latour both have one foot on each side of the social and natural sciences. First I will 
discuss Haraway's concept of naturecultures starting with her critique of studies on 
monkeys in the beginning of the 20th century. After that I will turn to Latour, hybrids 
and quasi-objects. 
 
3.2.2 Donna Haraway's naturecultures 
 
From the 1920- 1940s the discipline of animal sociology developed, making the 
hyphen in the nature-culture divide even longer. Donna Haraway examines this 
biobehavioural field to make an example of how the nature-culture divide is 
deepened and what that has led to (see also Haraway 1989). This was a time when 
the theories of hierarchical systems based on sociological functionalism gained 
influence. These new liberal theories engaged with the rational and efficient human, 
who should be designed as part of a society with prevailing social order. To be able 
to do this scientifically, scientists turned to animals, which they perceived to have a 
“special status as natural objects that can show people their origin”. In the animals 
the researchers saw nature, untouched by culture or human “management” and a 
possibility to research that “nature”. (Haraway 1991, 11.) 
 
Haraway points out a few things concerning the biobehavioural research and its 
outcomes, so that we can “understand how and why animals have been used in 
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theories” and theory formation (Haraway 1991, 12). Haraway is focusing on two of 
the key persons, the primatologists Clarance Ray Carpenter and Robert M. Yerkes. 
The first problem is that the researchers themselves and their surroundings were not 
untouched by culture. One example was so-called old boy networks that Haraway 
claims helped to form the whole discipline through granting funding or supporting 
only certain forms of science and not others. This was possible partly since the key 
persons in the field of animal sociology were so few. Another issue was the general 
science climate, still in a setting unaware of the feminist and post-colonial critique 
and studies yet to come, i.e. being racist and sexist without necessarily knowing it. 
Also affecting the research was the hopes of the researchers, with their aim to build 
rational management systems of social control, they were already viewing the world 
through lenses of hierarchy and domination before starting to look at the monkeys. 
(Haraway 1991, 12-15.) An aim behind these experiments was to find out how to 
build a rational society with social control through hierarchies and domination. 
 
The results they got based on the experiments on animals, mostly apes, were used to 
create theories on everything starting from evolution to mental illness, from 
communication to competition and in particularly sex and labour (Haraway 1991, 
12). While anthropology and sociology worked with social groups and culture, 
primates were studied to show nature in its essence and the origin of human 
behaviour, before culture came along. Through looking at experiments done to 
primates and what theory that has come out of those experiments, Haraway (1991, 
11) notes that “the biosocial sciences have not simply been sexist mirrors of our own 
social world. They have also been tools in reproduction of that world, both in 
supplying legitimation ideologies and in enhancing material power.” What Haraway 
is aiming at, is that if the research functioning as a base for how we view both 
humans and non-humans today, is based on research taking domination as a stepping 
stone as well as grounding these theories in studies done on animals that will affect 
the research. What the researchers missed was that they themselves were looking at 
their experiments through culture and that the research setting still is very much 
shaped by culture. 
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The presumed non-ideology of natural sciences, creating objective science, hides the 
fact that even though the numbers or the “nature” might be objective, the questions 
asked about them is not. Dividing subjects of research into categories of female and 
male can in itself be a political act as well as assuming and looking for leaders in a 
group of animals.  
 
Haraway's interest in animal sociology works as an example of how what is 
perceived natural can have far reaching consequences. Viewing something as a result 
of nature or culture affect how we perceive it. Instead of the categories of “nature” 
and “culture”, Haraway suggests the concept of naturecultures. A naturecultures 
continuum challenges the notion of a clear-cut line between what nature is and what 
culture is. The word naturecultures, coined by Haraway, opens up for a view of the 
world without the distinct dichotomies (Latimer 2013, 11). Haraway even talks about 
the implosion of nature and culture (Haraway 2003, 16, 18). The concept points out 
that there do not exist any clear borders between where nature stops and where 
culture starts or vice versa. Haraway claims, that in the end, the differences between 
what is called culture and nature are “mundane”, not “sublime”. (Haraway 2008, 15.) 
According to this logic, it would be a mistake to view nature and culture as two 
absolute, polar categories, and then make conclusions based on these categories. 
 
With naturecultures, one can bring both linguistics and materiality to the table at the 
same time, like Haraway does with social sciences and biology. This might help us to 
explain complicated phenomena that affect and shape our world, when “flesh and 
signifier, bodies and words, stories and worlds [...] are joined in naturecultures” 
(Haraway 2003, 20). One of the aims is to try to avoid reduction of complex relations 
and issues, or to include things that are left out previously, in explaining the world. 
 
Instead, Haraway sees that we need each other (and by we she does not only mean 
humans) in order to exist and co-exist, “to be someone is always to become with 
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many” (Haraway 2008, 4). By pointing at the bacteria that lives in the human 
stomach, Haraway suggests that the view of the human as separate exceptional being 
is a false view of the human, partly since our bodies are not as human as we might 
have thought. There are more bacteria than human cells in our whole body. The 
human genome is found only in 10 percent of the body with the rest consisting of 
different bacteria and fungus. The human could not exist without its non-human 
others inside it. (Haraway 2008, 3-4.) 
 
To continue to provoke, Haraway released her second manifesto, The Companion 
Species Manifesto (2003). In the concept of companion species, emphasize is on the 
co-constitutive relationship between humans and animals, and more particularly, 
humans and dogs. In her manifestos and the conceptual creations in them, the cyborg 
and companion species both bridge “the human and non-human, the organic and 
technological, […] and nature and culture in unexpected ways“. (Haraway 2003, 4.) 
In Companion Species Manifesto, Haraway is asking us not to only see dogs as a 
smart tool for human use, but to step outside of the anthropocentrism and see how 
the relationship works (at least) two ways, how “contingent mutability rule all the 
way down, into nature and culture, into naturecultures” (Haraway 2003, 12). By 
highlighting changes in herding and agriculture in early societies, one of her points is 
that the historical changes in dogs lives is mostly viewed as only biological changes 
when in human lives mostly cultural. This is even though we might actually have a 
combination of both in dogs and humans, or naturecultures at work. (Haraway 2003, 
31.) What is viewed as culture, nature and an actor “matter for political, ethical and 
emotional action” (Haraway 2003, 27). 
 
3.2.3 Bruno Latour's hybrids   
 
Another scholar who is in favour of not separating nature and culture is Bruno 
Latour. Latour states his point of view clearly, “there are only nature-cultures”, in his 
book We Have Never Been Modern (1993, 104). Yet, instead of building on 
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Haraway's trope naturecultures, Latour suggests hybrid networks of nature and 
culture, as well as the collective as ways of making sense of the world (Latour 1993, 
11; Latour, 2004, 238). 
 
To explain what he means, Latour (1993, 1) uses the example of a news article on the 
climate. Everything from the increasing ozone hole to chemical factories fit in the 
same article with international politics and treaties, together with a concern for our 
grandchildren. The same article contains paragraphs with politics, chemistry, 
international relations and ethics on both a global and local level, “none of these is 
commensurable, yet there they are, caught up in the same story”. (Ibid.) Since, 
according to Latour, our worlds are already mixed, like we can see in the article, we 
should analyse them in that way. Another example presented is an article on the 
AIDS virus, where medical corporations, religious groups, NGO:s and politicians 
meet in one place: 
 
"The smallest AIDS virus takes you from sex to the unconscious, then to Africa, 
tissue cultures, DNA and San Francisco, but the analysts, thinkers, journalists and 
decision-makers will slice the delicate network traced by the virus for you into tidy 
compartments where you will find only science, only economy, only social 
phenomena, only local news, only sentiments, only sex." (Latour 1993, 2)   
 
This opens up an interesting question in relation to journalism but a question maybe 
besides the topic of focus here. How would news and articles look like if they were 
not grouped into politics, economy and culture? Or phenomenon not divided after 
nation-states with foreign and national politics? What would happen if one instead 
would trace the hybrid networks, which are mixing nature and culture together? 
 
Latour does not only focus on hybrids and networks, he goes back to the start of 
modernity which he sees aa part of the whole problem. To remain modern, which is 
not something one would want to do, according to Latour, one has to subscribe to the 
practices of translation and purification separately. Purification means seeing humans 
and non-humans, nature and culture as two ontologically different categories, which 
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one cannot cross between. Translation is when these two categories start to crumble 
and become hybrids and networks. The first dichotomy lies between nature and 
culture and the second between purification and translation. When one disobeys 
these dichotomies, and they start to intersect, one has stopped being modern. (Latour 
1993, 11.) With purification crumbling, the possibility to create networks described 
in the news articles above opens up. Translation again goes together with what 
Latour (1993, 11) calls “the modern critical stance”. Latour's hypothesis is that “the 
more we forbid ourselves to conceive of hybrids, the more possible their 
interbreeding becomes” (1993, 12). By hinting at that the separation of something 
not “naturally” completely separate makes one see the faultiness of the separation.  
 
For Latour, the hybrids are quasi-objects or quasi-subjects. To help us understand, 
Latour creates a figure that links both nature in one end and society in the other (here 
as well the words society, political and culture are used somewhat as synonyms) and 
the quasi-object is placed in between. (Latour 1993, 51-52.) “Quasi-objects are much 
more social. Much more fabricated, much more collective than the “hard” parts of 
nature, but they are in no way the arbitrary receptacles of a full-fledged society” 
(Latour 1993, 55). Latour sees that science has a view of objects that he categorizes 
as soft and hard. Firstly, objects are just things onto which we project meaning, but 
they are meaningless in themselves. Yet, objects are also things from which we can 
retrieve objective truth through measurements. The view of nature is something both 
outside culture as well as a resource for culture and transformable by it. These two 
views do not go together, and are part of the dualism of nature and culture. 
 
So far, notes Latour (1993, 5-6), we are offered three sorts of glasses through which 
we can view the world, naturalization, socialization and deconstruction, or facts, 
power and discourse. A point with these categories is not that they actually would be 
the only ways that one can view the world, though the most common, but that they 
cannot be mixed: 
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“When the first speaks of naturalized phenomena, then societies, subjects, and all 
forms of discourse vanish. When the second speaks of fields of power, then science, 
technology, texts, and the contents of activities disappear. When the third speaks of 
truth effects, then to believe in the real existence of brain neurons or power plays 
would betray enormous naiveté. Each of these forms of criticism is powerful in itself 
but impossible to combine with the other two. Can anyone imagine a study that 
would treat the ozone hole as simultaneously naturalized, sociologized and 
deconstructed. […] Is it our fault if the networks are simultaneously real, like nature, 
narrated like discourse and collective, like society?” (Latour 1993, 5-6) 
 
The quote above functions as an example of which fortified lines of thought one 
could open up through thinking with hybrids instead of with dichotomies. It does not 
however solve the problem with what one can do, if one is not satisfied with the 
ontological and epistemological explanations of one of these fields but left with the 
problem of finding them impossible to combine in practice. The destruction of the 
dualism between nature and culture is for Latour very much linked with the divide 
between the natural and the social sciences. That is a crossing point for Haraway and 
Latour, who share interest in science studies. 
 
According to Latour, one should not either fall in the trap of seeing nature and 
culture as two separate spheres, which now are combined. He points out that their 
separation is not a “natural” one, but a cultural; “no one can claim under any 
circumstances to be dealing with two distinct preoccupations that had always evolved 
in parallel until they finally crossed paths” (Latour 2004, 28). One could make the 
observation that this is exactly what has happened in academia but what Latour 
means is more ontological. For Latour and Haraway among others, we are not facing 
a “natural” development of the sciences but correcting something that was wrong to 
begin with. If we stop being modern in the Latourian sense, we realize that the 
purification and translation has been there in our history and “our past begins to 
change” (Latour 1993, 11). Hence, the name and claim We Have Never Been 
Modern, instead of we have been modern but are not anymore. Along with 
modernity, various aspects of exploitative relations in naturecultures also begin to 
reveal themselves, leaving posthumanists with the claim that we have never been 
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human. More importantly, and inter-related, the problems with holding up and 
justifying domination in relation to humans and non-humans would have to be re-
thought (Latour 2013, 11). The link between modernity and humanism is clear for 
Latour and he makes a point in stating that with the invention of humanism also 
comes the “simultaneous birth of 'nonhumanity'” (Latour 1993, 13). 
 
The categories of nature, culture and naturecultures can be problematized from 
several different positions making the whole discussion a bit confused. One could 
claim that there are two separate categories, nature and culture. One could make a 
counter-argument that those categories are false, there is only one, naturecultures. So 
far it is fairly simple. Then one can argue that nature actually is culture, since culture 
is needed to close of a category like nature and what belongs in it is decided by 
culture. That leaves, however, very little room for the materiality that is in focus in 
posthumanism. Yet another aspect is seeing that nature and culture used to be 
separate but now, because of humans blurring the clear lines with GMO, cloning or 
the Anthropocene, the categories starts to intertwine. This view could be categorized 
as being closer to a more transhumanist standpoint. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
 
In this chapter the crucial frameworks for posthumanism, anthropocentrism and 
nature-culture has been explored. Instead a post-anthropocentric view of the 
naturecultures continuum is suggested. Post-anthropocentrism (or non-
anthropocentrism) is not a concept that has been developed in different directions the 
same way like naturecultures but it is something that permeates posthumanism in the 
same way, along with the literal interest in materiality.    
 
One problem with a concept like naturecultures is that one might lose exactness and 
accuracy. By clumping two concepts together, that used to be binaries, one might end 
up with a broad concept involving everything, like naturecultures. What can actually 
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be done with that? Still, one then have to ask, in that case, how exact is/was nature or 
culture as concepts in the first place? 
 
Another easy critique is simply to not take this line of thought seriously, as it 
involves no hard facts and it might feel alien or absurd. Why should one listen to 
these people after many hundreds of years of building theory in the humanities (as 
well as natural sciences). Scepticism for concepts like naturecultures and other 
posthumanist theories makes some scholars feel the need to situate them in “a 
tradition of research that takes materialities seriously” (Latimer & Miele 2013, 16). It 
is also easy to dismiss post-anthropocentrism as an impossible project for a human 
being. A comment to the standpoint not to take posthumanism seriously would be to 
remember the long quote by Latour, ending with “is it our fault if the networks are 
simultaneously real, like nature, narrated like discourse and collective, like society” 
(Latour 1993, 6). Even though the argument might be childish, “it is not our fault”, it 
still tries to start to imagine how to rethink the world in a more complex way, even if 
it does not have any ready answers yet. This curiosity is something to take with from 
posthumanism, to dare to think outside the safe and established, at least for a 
moment. 
 
A possible problem with Latour's notion of the quasi-object is that does one not need 
the two poles of nature and culture to have a quasi-object? If that is the case then 
does one not have to maintain the dualisms to have a quasi-object? When it comes to 
Haraway, her theory (at least the parts used in this thesis) could be critiqued as 
rhetorical tools and tropes, not being scientific enough. Haraway's naturecultures 
could be viewed as more of an ontological (re-)creation story, in the world of 
cyborgs and dogs. One should also remember that the creation of new concepts could 
be labelled as some sort of a posthumanist method, since new lines of thinking 
requires new words. 
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In her discussion on nature and culture, Vicky Kirby examines theory by both Judith 
Butler and Bruno Latour. Butler has not been discussed here, since she is situated in 
the field of cultural constructionism (Kirby 2008, 218) and not inside the 
posthumanist turn. Butler is still working with the materiality of bodies in a similar 
way to many of the posthumanist theorists (Butler 1993). Kirby (2008, 215-216) 
notes that “it is somewhat routine within critical discourse to diagnose binary 
oppositions as if they are pathological symptoms”. This is an important point to 
remember, just because something is in binary opposition it is not inherently bad, 
like binary code. Instead one should look at aspects behind the oppositions, why they 
exist and what they are creating.      
 
Even though the concepts and theory discussed in this chapter have problematic 
aspects, the emancipatory possibilities claimed by these theorists are noteworthy. 
Through naturecultures, Haraway claims that one can reduce the need for a system 
built on domination, and through that, the domination that comes with categories of 
race, class and gender (Haraway 1991, 2). Latour (2004, 25-26) agrees when 
predicting a necessary death of nature, after the “death of God and Man”. Instead he 
is starting to sketch a political ecology without nature, since if the category of nature 
allows “to recapitulate the hierarchy of beings in a single ordered series”, Latour 
(2004, 25) then finds it logical to get rid of nature. There seems to be a lot of politics, 
ideology and investment in a category that is presumed to be outside all of that. Since 
how we perceive the world ontologically has political consequences, this separation 
can, in the name of science, have devastating consequences.  Nature can and has 
been used to justify and motivate oppression and hierarchies between genders, races 
and classes:  
 
“we are all familiar with the ravages of social Darwinism, which borrowed its 
metaphors from politics, projected them onto nature itself, and then reimported them 
into politics in order to add the seal of an irrefragable natural order to the domination 
of the wealthy. Feminists have shown often enough how the assimilation of women 
to nature had the effect of depriving women of all political rights for a very long 
time.” (Latour 2004, 33) 
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There are countless of examples of how views of different behaviours as natural take 
part in creating and holding up the structures of sexism, racism and capitalism. That 
is not natural, hence it is wrong is a shaky but useful argument. “Nature” has had an 
impact on who is doing the unpaid labour, like washing clothes and cooking food, to 
who has the right to eat or become eaten. Historical and contemporary examples can 
be found from everyday life, like who is allowed to get married, or more extreme 
ones, like apartheid or how ones ethnicity can become a death sentence. Repeating 
“boys will be boys” already in pre-school can work as a legitimization and 
normalization of sexual harassment. A comment like “it is part of human nature to be 
greedy, so the society can never become equal” is building on this assumed natural 
essence which no one really seem to manage to define. The nature-culture divide 
works well to cover up how what exists actually is more formable and fluid. A 
posthumanist perspective can help one to get rid of dichotomies which produce 
unnecessary, and harmful, sources of determination in society.  
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4. Posthumanism and media studies 
 
The aim of this chapter is to look into how the posthumanist theory from Chapter 
Two and Three resonates with and is developing in media studies. This will be done, 
firstly by defining media, then by looking at Marshall McLuhan and Friedrich Kittler 
for a more established view on media materiality. Posthumanist thinking is not yet 
that present in media and communication theory, but there are still a few concepts 
which strongly intersect with posthumanist theories and the concepts of post-
anthropocentrism and naturecultures. Parikka (2010, 203) remarks that 
“posthumanist media theory is less about what comes after the human than what 
constitutes the non-human forces inside and beyond the form of the human”. There 
are (at least) three ways to approach media and communication with the 
posthumanist theory discussed earlier in this thesis. They are to look at the 
materiality (and geology) of media in a very literal way, to investigate where 
medianatures could take one and to see what a post-anthropocentric media ecology 
would look like. All of these threads of thinking are just slowly starting to develop 
into something more coherent. 
 
The most obvious posthumanist concept in recent media theory is medianatures, a 
continuation of naturecultures but specifically for media studies. Medianatures is 
coined by Jussi Parikka, one of the most influential names in relation to posthumanist 
media theory. Secondly, Parikka is also working with the geological aspects of media 
which takes the materiality of media to a very concrete level. Thirdly, some more or 
less posthumanist contributions by Levy Bryant as well as Matthew Fuller and 
Andrew Goffey will also be brought up. With the concept of the “machine” and “evil 
media” they are giving non-human actors a clear position inside media and 
communication studies. This chapter will elaborate on the above mentioned 
concepts, starting with medianatures and to see what happens when the ontological 
debates are viewed in a light of a more concrete matter. What can this way of 
thinking actually bring to media studies? Is media something solely for humans? And 
can a medium be viewed as a non-human actor? We will start by looking at what 
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media actually is since how the already fluid concept is understood is challenged by 
posthumanist thinking. 
 
4.1 What is media?  
 
There are many possible routes to questions of materiality and matter in relation to 
media and communication, for example, analysis of non-human networks, computer 
hardware and objects. Firstly, what needs to be taken in consideration is the 
definition of media (plural of medium). What media are, is already a very confused 
category. Defining both the field of research as well as the object of study can be 
surprisingly difficult. What are media and media theory exactly? Even though media 
studies is growing and media is being studied in many other disciplines, there is no 
consensus decision of the meaning of media (Horn 2008, 7). 
 
According to Ampuja (2010, 52), something that unites media scholars is the view 
that it is problematic to give a clear and simple definition of what media is. With the 
increasing amount of smart phones and the rapid development of ICT-innovations, a 
more conventional view of media as a one-way mass medium was abolished. Media 
can be viewed as “any material that carries symbolic meanings or facilitates 
interpersonal communication and social co-ordination” (ibid.). Another way to put it, 
even broader, is to say that media is “any material through which something else can 
be transmitted” (Hartley 2002, 169). Hartley (2002, 170) still makes a difference 
between media and media of communication, where the key word in media of 
communication is message: “any means by which a message may be transmitted”. 
The critique of this definition is offered by Hartley (ibid.) himself in the next 
sentence, “just about anything can transmit a message”. This Hartley blames on the 
“promiscuousness of human semiosis“, making an interesting assumption that media 
needs to transmit a human message. 
 
In other words, defining media is not an easy task and one that media scholars still 
have not found a clear answer to, “what a medium 'is' has been (and continues to be) 
the object of heated debate” (Horn 2008, 7). Even though the concept has become 
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wider than what perhaps originally was meant with it, that aspect is not often brought 
up in course books (Parikka 2010, xiii-xiv). Some scholars even reject media as an 
ontological concept (Horn 2008, 10). One can also go as far as Eva Horn, following 
Kittler and Siegert, claiming that there are no media.  That, in fact, is something that 
according to Horn unites people in what she calls “new media theory”, that they are 
rejecting “any fixed concept of 'media' itself”. (Horn 2008, 7.) 
 
For Horn, what is more fruitful than to look at the ontological aspects of media, is to 
look at broader networks, or assemblages, and instead ask what media does. The 
complexity of what the research in this “new media theory” is trying to take on is 
best illustrated by Horn's own words: 
 
“Within this type of media analysis, institutions play as important a role as 
technologies, and modes of coding and notation, archiving, and the transfer of data 
are as crucial as questions of the political or strategic impacts of media […] 
Theorizing media thus means not so much analyzing a given, observable object as 
engaging with processes, transformations, and events. Media are not only the 
conditions of possibility for events – be they the transfer of a message, the 
emergence of a visual object, or the re-representation of things past – but are in 
themselves events: assemblages or constellations of certain technologies, fields of 
knowledge, and social institutions.” (Horn 2008, 7- 8) 
 
To me, this German media theory, in the praising words of Horn (2008, 9-10), seems 
surprisingly similar to posthumanist aims. Both working interdisciplinary, 
connecting social and natural sciences and looking at materiality, technology and 
power with a focus outside anthropocentrism, in “an attempt to purge the humanities 
of their humanistic baggage” (Horn 2008, 9). The focus on materiality is also clearly 
there; “post-Foucauldian media theory broadens the scope of an archaeology of 
knowledge by including the material objects that enable its constitution” (Horn 2008, 
11). It is also from the tradition of German media theory that we will find some of 
the predecessors to the lines of thinking now developed under the label of 
posthumanism, new materialism and object-oriented ontology in relation to media 
and communication theory. 
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Jussi Parikka (2012a, 84 – 88) traces this “new media materialism”, which according 
to him still is waiting for a better term, from German media materialism and 
something he calls the “Kittler-effect” into the perceived immateriality of digital 
culture. In the search for a historical perspective on the materiality of media, which 
Parikka refers to as media archaeology, concepts by Kittler and Foucault are used to 
go back “not only in time, but inside the machine” (Parikka 2012a, 81). Behind the 
digital content in a computer, one can find material hardware and components that 
enables the software to work and more generally the possibilities for digital media 
and communication. This line of thinking by Kittler as well as McLuhan's electric 
light will be explored next, together with what this so called new media materialism 
contains. 
 
4.2 New/Media/Materialism 
 
This media materialism which Parikka calls new, pays attention to the materials and 
objects which are needed for communication to take place, takes as its starting point 
the premise that “cultural meanings, articulations, perceptions, metaphors, 
statements, and discourses are not free-floating ideal signs and ideas; they are very 
deeply rooted in the information channels that make them possible” (Parikka 2007, 
6). Shortly said, “matter matters” (Barad 2003, 803) and that is also the case for 
communication and language. 
 
Katherine Hayles has showed how it is especially clear in communication and 
information theory how the Cartesian idea of a mind/body split has influenced our 
way of thinking, how information is often defined through an exclusion of 
materiality and embodiment (Hayles 2010; Brown 2010, 55). According to Bill 
Brown, critical media studies and new materialism share the same interest “by 
drawing attention to a materiality of the signifier, now understood as the signifying 
effects of matter itself” (Brown 2010, 59). While building on social constructionist 
theories, the posthumanist or new materialist view on matter is at the same time a 
critique of social constructionism for leaving out matter and only staying inside 
language (Åsberg et al. 2012, 30-31). Still, the materiality of media does not have to 
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be abstract or complicated. To start to understand the materiality of media, how signs 
and matter are intertwined, it can be enough to double click to open up a document or 
type on your keyboard with a mouse arm or tennis elbow. (Brown 2010, 60). Another 
way to express it, to grasp the meaning of materiality for communication, would be 
to view it as Jussi Parikka (2007, 7) explains: “information technologies are on a 
material/corporeal level the stuff that increasingly holds together the symbolic 
(representational) frame of contemporary culture”. In other words, this material-
semiotic view does not want to separate the two into completely different spheres. 
 
In visioning the materiality of communication and media one can go in many 
different directions. The aim is not to leave out the cultural, linguistic and social 
aspects but to add the material aspect. First of all, the importance of the body for 
communication, body language is an embodied and extremely important part of 
communicating where blood, muscles and nerves come into play. Another aspect is 
computers and the seemingly immaterial networks of the Internet. Also Internet and 
its networks are materially anchored. Google has server halls, all over the world as 
well as in Hamina, Finland. Without them such an everyday thing as googling 
something would not be possible.  
 
Furthermore, one can think of different mediums and their role in communicating, 
reading a newspaper made of paper or on an LCD screen are different experiences. 
Just like what soft or hardware a machine consists of effect the communication. If 
one is to dig even deeper, one can reach the tiny minerals that mobile phones and 
other ICT products are made of, and their role in how we communicate. While 
Latour traced the ozone layer with Monsanto and his fridge, Parikka sees a potential 
for new media materialism to study minerals used in electronics, shaping the geology 
of media. That thought will be developed later on in this chapter.   
 
Already in the 1960s, Marshall McLuhan made himself famous by stating that the 
medium is the message (McLuhan 1964). According to McLuhan's medium theory, 
technology works as an extension of the human and its senses and actively takes part 
in shaping our environment and culture. Media affect and transform human societies. 
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Hence, the medium transmitting a message has greater impact on us than the 
message itself. (Laughey 2007, 33). One of the examples McLuhan uses is that of an 
electric light, since it does not contain something we would define as “content”. For 
McLuhan (1964/1968, 15), the “electric light is pure information. It is a medium 
without a message,” and we tend to fail to see it as a medium because of that. 
Instead, McLuhan suggests that it is because the electric light does not have 
“content” that we can actually see it for what it is, and how it, as a medium, shapes 
humans. (McLuhan 1964/1968, 15-17.) Seen from McLuhan's point of view, it is not 
the content that has the most (trans)formative role, but the medium itself. Hence he is 
suggesting a shift of focus from the message to the medium, “from informational 
content to technical form” (Hansen 2006, 298) into the embodied aspects behind 
media and communication. What might feel like an obvious thing in the geographical 
location where this thesis is written, the access to electric light all day and all night, 
is not obvious everywhere. In places where there are no electricity networks or only 
part time access to electricity, reading, writing and studying is only possible during 
certain hours of the day. 
 
If one is to analyse media materiality with a focus on the hardware “behind” 
communication, Friedrich Kittler is the pioneer. Just as McLuhan, from which Kittler 
got inspiration, Kittler (1999) is also most famous for a specific sentence: “Media 
determine our situation”. (Hansen 2006, 297-298.) 
 
The interdisciplinarity that runs through most of the theory discussed here is also an 
important part of Kittler's thinking, who found influences to his work by combining 
early information theory a la Shannon and Weaver with McLuhan and Lacan with 
Foucault. Nicholas Gane (2005) explores the thoughts and theory by Kittler in 
relation to posthumanism. The media science proposed by Kittler aims to go beyond 
representation and audience studies to prerequisite for information of flows, 
computers, hardware and to their storage as well as memory. 
 
Gane argues that “in an age in which decisions increasingly are made for us by media 
systems we have little choice but to use”, the famous statement by Kittler – “media 
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determine our situation” – is becoming evident in our everyday life (Gane 2005, 40). 
Kittler's technological determinism is, however, very problematic from a 
posthumanist perspective (Åsberg et al. 2012, 24). Instead of discussing if Kittler is 
“pure” enough to be labelled as a posthumanist thinker, I acknowledge that at least 
Kittler has made an impact on media studies and through that how media scholars 
engage with posthumanism after him. There is also a more easily approachable way 
for posthumanists to look at the question of technological determinism in this case. 
The argument, presented by Mark Hansen, on a different way to read McLuhan and 
Kittler builds on Gilbert Simondon's concept of transduction, “a relation in which the 
relation itself holds primacy over the related” (Hansen 2006, 299). For Hansen, this 
reading places McLuhan right on the spot as a theorist on “the inseparability of 
culture and technics” (ibid.), as well as challenging the concept of technical (and 
technological) determinism: 
 
“there simply is no such thing as technical determinism, not because technics don't 
determine our situation, but because they don't (and cannot) do so from a position 
that is outside culture; likewise, there is no such thing as cultural constructivism – 
understood as a rigid, blanket privileging of ideology or cultural agency – not 
because culture doesn't construct ideology and experience, but because it doesn't (and 
cannot) do so without depending on technologies that are beyond the scope of its 
intentionality, of the very agency of cultural ideology.” (Hansen 2006, 299) 
 
Hansen’s argument, in this continuum between culture and technology, is similar to 
the naturecultures continuum by Haraway in Chapter Three. Parikka develops the 
term medianatures to look into naturecultures from a more media specific point of 
view, which will be explored later next. It is still of interest here to see this link, 
found in McLuhan, between “the human and the technical”, which makes Hansen 
want to compare him to Hayles, finding a similar presence of embodiment in their 
theories on information. 
 
Gane (2005) also compares Kittler to McLuhan and Hayles' views of the posthuman. 
While Kittler, according to Gane (2005), has the same starting points as both 
McLuhan and Hayles, he then deviates and critiques them for being too focused on 
human-centred media theory. Kittler takes another direction since he wants to move 
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away from and stay outside humans. Comparing Kittler to Hayles, a key figure in 
theorizing the posthuman, already partly limits the analysis to a (post)human focused 
perspective. By reading Kittler in relation to the posthuman, like Gane does, it seems 
as if one cannot leave anthropocentrism behind, when a more posthumanist reading 
could open up for that. In fact, Kittler's request for a sociology consisting of more 
than human beings (Kittler 2001, 102-3, quoted in Gane 2005) echoes similarly to 
Bruno Latour rather than Hayles and McLuhan. 
 
4.3 Medianatures 
 
When developing his own concept, medianatures, by building on Haraway’s 
naturecultures, but for media and communication studies, Jussi Parikka points to the 
same issue as many other posthumanists. Even though, Parikka (2012b, 95) talks 
about new materialism and not posthumanism, the main rhetoric is the same; we are 
already there, in this posthumanist world and that cannot be ignored anymore since 
“[n]ew materialism is already present in the way technical media transmits and 
processes 'culture'”.  This concept, medianatures, is a way for Parikka to be able to 
simultaneously analyse how “earth materials are essential for media devices to 
become media in the first place, but also how our relation to the earth is mediated by 
the epistemological framing of advanced media” (Parikka 2013).  
  
Parikka (2012b, 95) asks us to think of the huge role of media and mediation in the 
new materialist (and other posthumanist) theory and debates in general. The aim is 
not to equate complicated phenomena to media or technology, just to be aware of the 
importance of their role. What has to be taken into consideration, according to 
Parikka (ibid.), is the “active meaning making of objects themselves non-reducible to 
signification”. The objects are affecting and effecting their environment as real 
material things, even though they might not be easily perceived by humans.    
 
For Parikka (2012b, 98), a critical aspect for new materialism is to build a theory of 
things, “a media theory of things” to be able to look closer at processes, networks 
and different media. Since “things do stuff” (ibid.) we have to look at them also to be 
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able to work with the question of what media actually is. Therefore, Parikka suggests 
the term medianatures as a way to theoretically “make sense of this continuum 
between mediatic apparatuses and their material contexts in the exploitation of 
nature” (Parikka 2012b, 97). A separation between for example soft and hardware 
does not make the processes justice, instead they could be viewed as a continuum, 
where signs are transferred to cables which turn them into signs again. Parikka talks 
about messy networks, and describes something that could be called network 
ecology:   
 
“how a mineral, itself born as part of the activity of matter some hundreds of millions 
of years ago, participates in an assemblage of information technologies, which are 
themselves embedded in various levels of catalyzing forces – global trade, human 
labor, standardization processes, manufacturing – the multiple circulations of desire 
that frame electronic media devices as part of post-Fordist capitalism, the a-
signifying operations from magnetic stripes to software code, parts of the abstraction 
levels of computers and networks.” (Parikka 2012b, 98) 
 
To be able to start to dig into this more properly, Parikka is calling for a process-
oriented new media materialism with a methodology that could capture the 
multiplicity of materialism in relation to media. It is not enough either to just 
suddenly see that the material/things is/are there, that they exist, even though to 
“think beyond representation and signification” can be liberating (Parikka 2012b, 
98). Seeing objects and matter is not only liberating, matter is not only “nice”, it can 
also be lethal for any living being. Instead Parikka (2012b, 98-99) asks for more 
cultural reflection of the material aspects of media. To return to the suggested 
concept medianatures, to view media and nature as a continuum, means that they 
cannot be separated, not in theory nor in the study of them. The idea with 
medianatures is that it could work as a tool to help one see how intertwined what we 
call media content and media technology is with what we call nature. Medianatures 
as a concept can have a function to show the complex relationship media have with 
nature, or nature with media, if we talk of them as if they would be two separate and 
distinct categories. 
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This needs a lot of careful thinking and Parikka warns us not to take pre-set answers 
when sketching these new media materialisms. We are not only dealing with macro-
sized everyday objects, even though they help us to think beyond representation but 
also objects like dust or chemical elements. Parikka's newest contribution to the 
discussion is to start sketching on the Geology of Media (2015), which will be 
explored in the next subchapter. This approach on nature, or medianatures, reflects 
more on the external environment than perceived natural essences.   
 
4.4 Media materials and digital rubbish 
 
In the media analysis of the Anthropocene, Jussi Parikka plays with the concept by 
naming it the Anthrobscene (Anthropocene and obscene). Playing with the word 
Anthropocene is a way for Parikka to point out the absurdity in the situation we are 
in, dealing with “a horrific human-caused drive toward a sixth mass extinction of 
species”. (2015a, 6.) What Parikka wants to suggest is that more focus should be 
directed towards the geological aspects of our global media culture (2015, 1) to be 
able to analyse media networks, but also the role of media in the Anthropocene. 
 
For all of our global media systems and information and communication technology 
to work, there is a lot of geological material involved. This is not only connected to 
new technology like our individual mobile phones, laptops and ipods either. The 
chemical necessity for analogue photography to work is one example raised by 
Parikka, to explain how and why we need to take the earth into consideration in 
media studies. This way, our analysis should start long before the development of 
different technologies, enabling the transmission of radio signals for example, and 
instead study minerals, chemicals and other matter. (2015a, 4.) Looking at it from 
this perspective, “one can start reading history of media and technology long before 
media becomes media” (Parikka 2015a, 3). This proposed analysis does not stop 
there either, but it continues with media technological waste; “media that is not 
media any longer” (2015a, 17) and the toxins involved with that, to try to present “an 
alternative materialism for a geophysical media age” (2015a, 5). One could ask why 
this is necessary to involve in media studies, why not focus on ones area of expertise 
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and leave the geology for geologists. Except for the growing amount of electronic 
waste, it is a tantalizing thought. In a time where claims are made that media 
technology increase democracy, one might look at the other side of the coin 
concerning media technology.     
 
In the year 2005 approximately 130.000 computers were thrown out per day. As the 
increase in sale goes up, so does the kilograms of waste. The biggest producer of e-
waste is the Global North, it is estimated that by the year 2020, EU alone will 
produce 12 million tons of e-waste every year. (Maxwell & Miller 2012, 3.) 
 
The planned obsolescence of media devices is around 12 months, then the product 
becomes uncool or simply breaks down (Maxwell & Miller 2012, 3). In between 
1997 and 2007 around 5 000 million computers were disposed in the US. In materials 
this makes “6.32 billion pounds of plastic, 1.58 billion pounds of lead, three million 
pounds of cadmium, 1.9 million pounds of chromium, and 632, 000 pounds of 
mercury” (ibid.). The metals that go into media technology take up a big part of the 
whole market share (from 2008): “36 percent of all tin, 25 percent of cobalt, 15 
percent of palladium, 15 percent silver, 9 percent of gold, 2 percent of copper, and 1 
percent of aluminium” (Maxwell & Miller 2012, 93; also quoted in Parikka 2015a, 
15). These numbers show to what degree our batteries, displays, catalysts and fibre 
optic cables consist of minerals such as cobalt, indium, platinum, palladium, 
germanium to name a few and how their role in global trade and politics is increasing 
(Parikka 2015a, 44). 
 
A continuum of medianatures, or naturecultures, opens up when these geological 
aspects are investigated. As we have seen above, minerals in media devices have a 
history that starts far longer “before being mined by cheap labor in developing 
countries” and used for a few years in a laptop or smart phone. The history of the 
mineral does not start nor end with that, but often continues as “e-waste leaking 
toxins into nature” probably in another developing country. (Parikka 2012b, 97-98.) 
Even though the mineral in the device does not have a specific function for 
communication any more, after the device is dumped, it is still performing processes. 
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Too be able to look at the networks and effects of communication technology, one 
might have to start thousands of years before the invention of the phone but also 
acknowledge that one's broken phone is still a “thing doing stuff” (Parikka 2012b, 
98) despite the fact that a human being is not using it. Even though the original and 
intended function of the device is not working, it does not mean that it stops existing 
and stops affecting its surroundings. This geological take on media opens up for a 
different understanding of the influence and the effects of media. 
 
Jennifer Gabrys elaborates on digital rubbish theory, or like she calls it, garbology.  
Rubbish (and technological garbage) is not something that should be viewed as 
separate from nature, as something which is destroying the purity of nature. Instead 
Gabrys suggests a view of garbage as “an integral aspect of processes of 
materialization” (2013, 150). To understand garbage as something that destroys 
nature would not help to analyse it more clearly, since that only excludes nature from 
our analysis of the situation. Instead, one could see that “[t]hese technologies are not 
only a part of natural-cultural arrangements; they also provide insight into the 
ecologies we inhabit” (2013, 153) and this view makes it easier for humans to face 
the ecological and political challenges of digital rubbish. The list of minerals used in 
electronics also hints at the hopelessness of trying to view nature as something pure 
which then becomes contaminated by something built by culture. 
 
This is one aspect of a more posthumanist view on media, mixing naturecultures and 
taking a post-anthropocentric stance on a mediums ability to act, even though it is not 
used by humans. In a context where the human is said to have such an impact on that 
planet that it can be viewed as a geological force, there might be something in the 
geology of media that is fruitful to explore.   
 
Parikka also notes that Kittler was heading on to a similar track, or that he himself is 
following Kittler, by starting to explore these same issues. One difference is that for 
Parikka, Kittler is lacking the aspect of labour: “we could as justifiably track down 
genealogies of media materials back to labour processes, exploitation, and the 
dangerous conditions that characterize also the current persistence of hardwork 
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alongside persistence of hardware.” (Parikka 2015a, 48.) The media technology used 
is not used in a vacuum, but has effects and consequences which are economical, 
political and social as well as ecological. 
 
Except for the materials needed to make “media” (technology) and the implications 
that have for children in Congolese mines or suicide rates in Chinese factories, there 
are other things to look at as well. With the help of dust in the gaming industry, 
Parikka connects worker's lungs with media, since the example of dust is a factor 
combining labour and geological aspects of media. Listing the damage different 
mineral has on bodies also makes the material affects of media more visible. It shows 
how lead, cadmium, mercury and barium cause damage to the nervous and 
reproductive system as well as the brain, kidneys and blood system. (Parikka 2015b, 
95.) In this case it is only human bodies which are focused on and Parikka is 
clarifying that he does not want to make a distinction between human and non-
human. Instead he talks about “lungs and breath, games and work” (Parikka 2013, 3) 
and by looking at both ICT and organs, the two levels of materiality are combined. 
Parikka (2015b, 96) borrows the idea of mixed materialities from Felix Guattari's 
mixed semiotics, pointing out that there is not only one aspect of materiality but 
many; “from practices of labor to production chains on to the chemicals and 
components that compose the technology” (Parikka 2015b, 97). By simultaneously 
looking at objects, affect and political economy, Parikka is taking steps in a direction 
of breaching new materialism with historical materialism in relation to media (ibid.).   
 
4.5 Media machines 
 
Levy Bryant, who is one of the leading philosophers of object-oriented ontology, 
OOO, together with Graham Harman, takes on the aspect of media. In Bryant's book 
Onto-cartography, an Ontology of Machines and Media (2014), Bryant sketches a 
step towards a more posthuman media ecology. Object-oriented ontology belongs to 
the speculative realist turn in continental philosophy, which is part of the 
posthumanist turn. 
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Beginning from the ontological materiality of McLuhan but continuing further on, 
Bryant critiques and develops it in at least two ways. “To study media is not simply 
to investigate technologies, tools, artefacts, and forms of communication”. (Bryant 
2014, 35.) Instead, Bryant wants us to also focus on the “way in which machines are 
structurally coupled to one another and modify one another, regardless of whether or 
not humans are involved” (ibid.). First of all, Bryant's use of the concept machine 
needs some explanation. For Bryant, a machine is a better word for what we could 
have called object since it changes that ontological understanding of that 
object/machine (2014, 36). For him any “'[e]ntity,' 'object,' 'existent,' 'substance,' 
'body,' and 'thing,' are all synonymous of 'machine'” (Bryant 2014, 1). Bryant argues 
that when an object needs a subject, a machine is active or a being on its own, and 
viewing media as machines can therefore be a way to step out of the anthropocentric 
subject/object division (ibid.). Therefore, Bryant is talking about media when he 
talking about machines, meaning also media when saying machine (2014, 35). All of 
this makes understanding him slightly confusing also since the title of his book still 
includes both “machine” and “media”. Bryant continues to use the concept media in 
the book and the both concepts are naturally interrelated. Basically, for Bryant, a 
medium is working like a sort of abstract machine.  
 
Bryant has made the same observations as new materialists on how language is not 
enough to explain the world and by creating his own onto-cartography, or “thing- 
mapping”, he hopes to begin to dig into how media or machines work. In this 
posthuman media ecology which Bryant (2014, 9) is building, a “medium is 
understood as any entity affording and constraining possibilities of movement and 
interaction with other entities in the world”. Bryant uses the same example by 
McLuhan, as mentioned earlier, of the electric light without a specific content, as 
media (2014, 33). The electric light, or any other medium, affects us and our 
relations. 
 
While Bryant (2014, 32) seems to agree with McLuhan that the “material properties 
and powers, substantially modify human activities and relations in ways that outpace 
the content of the medium”, he has some objections to McLuhan's anthropocentric 
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approach to media. One reason for this is the view on media that is closely connected 
to human senses. If one views media, as McLuhan does, as an extension of man, and 
more particularly of his senses, then it is difficult to not look at media from an 
anthropocentric point of view. Bryant's objection is that a medium and the research 
and analysis of it should not only be focused and interested in what works as 
“extended sense-organs, but also with how machines modify and extend the activity 
and becoming of entities” (Bryant 2014, 34). Without the electric light we could not 
read or write after sunset. A smartphone does not only function as an extension of the 
human but affects our behaviour in how often or how quickly we can or do certain 
activities. The McLuhanesque view that technology enhances the senses is 
remodelled by Bryant to include more than human senses even though he takes that 
as a point of departure to build from.  
 
A point by Bryant is that the medium is not only modifying human activities but all 
sorts of non-human relations as well. The same electric light changes the behaviour 
of different insects as well as animals that hunt insects. (Bryant 2014, 34.) The life of 
for example a mosquito, a bat or a gecko is affected by an electric light, just as it is 
affecting humans. Light can play an important part in survival, as well as navigation 
for many animals. Bryant also points out that media can “happen” completely 
without human involvement. One example he uses is how birds use the Earth’s 
electromagnetic fields as a tool for navigation. (Ibid.) 
 
Bryant argues that McLuhan is of great importance for a more posthumanist 
approach to media since McLuhan himself opens up ontological questions which 
then even are challenging his own reasoning. “McLuhan's notion of media explodes 
its restriction to particular carriers of human communication and meaning, allowing 
us to think a medium as structural couplings between machines” (Bryant 2014, 34-
35). Ironically, Bryant is claiming that the academic who viewed technology as an 
extension of the human and its senses already laid the ground for thinking media 
outside an anthropocentric framework. 
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4.6 Evil media 
 
Another start to a more materialist media ecology is presented by Matthew Fuller and 
Andrew Goffey, who are developing something they call evil media. Fuller and 
Goffey explain that the “evil” in evil media does not point at something which is bad, 
however: 
 
“Evil media studies is not a discipline, nor is it the description of a category of 
particularly unpleasant media objects. It is a manner of working with a set of 
informal practices and bodies of knowledge, characterised as stratagems, which 
pervade contemporary networked media and which straddle the distinction between 
the work of theory and of practice.” (Fuller & Goffey, 2009, 141) 
 
The stratagems developed by Fuller and Goffey are 16 altogether. A stratagem could 
be explained as a strategic plan to fool one's enemy and Fuller and Goffey (2009, 
146) anchor their use of it in Schopenhauer. Instead of listing all of the stratagems, 
which would be too extensive for a thesis, I will be focusing on a few which are of 
interest here. For a more thorough view on evil media studies, see Fuller and Goffey 
2012. 
 
Stratagem one consists of looking at media outside the field of representation. Fuller 
and Goffey write that when analysing digital media, an aspect of materiality, besides 
representation, has to be included to make a more complete analysis. The 
“increasingly infrastructural nature of communications in a world of digital media” 
makes the linguistic aspects of media less important and highlights the hardware and 
software behind it. For them, language even become somewhat of an object itself, 
through its use in programming, and through its role in the economy as well as it 
being something which brakes the dichotomy between subject and object. This is an 
interesting claim that they do not open up more clearly, but leaves on a slightly 
cryptical level. (Fuller & Goffey 2009, 141-142.) 
 
In stratagem three Fuller and Goffey elaborate on what the use of evil in evil media 
opens up: “evil is a good name for the strategies of the object, for what things do in 
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themselves without bothering to pass through the subjective demand for meaning” 
(Fuller & Goffey 2009, 143-144). This comes very close to a view of media and 
objects which can act without a subject. It also follows somewhat of a process-
ontological view. The posthumanist argument about the discursive and world-
forming aspects of matter, without a subject with intent, resonates closely to this.  
 
How an algorithm works, and operates without humans, is the point in stratagem six; 
“the autonomy of code, its independence from human interference, is not 
incompatible with the existence of the strategically marshalled multitude of agents 
who bring it into being” (Fuller & Goffey 2009, 146). What is created by humans can 
have a long life of its own, just like Parikka's example earlier of a battery for a 
mobile phone. What also should be noticed is that to view humans as the only part in 
creating an algorithm (or a mobile phone) is a fairly anthropocentric take on that 
“creation process”. What about the need for computers or a global network of 
Internet? 
 
Even though Fuller and Goffey are not that clearly affiliated with the rest of the 
posthumanists discussed in this thesis, there are aspects of evil media which come 
fairly close to a posthumanist or new materialist analysis of media. By largely 
ignoring representation, and seeing how objects can act without human involvement 
they are asking similar questions as other posthumanists. Here is should be noted that 
all of their stratagems are not as clearly interesting from a posthumanist perspective 
and they include topics like viral marketing and java scripts. Matthew Fuller (2005) 
has also written on media ecology with a materialist perspective and he sees that a 
focus on “materiality is most fruitful where it is often deemed irrelevant, in the 
‘immaterial’ domains of electronic media” (Fuller 2005, 2).     
 
4.7 Concluding remarks   
 
In this chapter concepts like medianatures, geological aspects of media as well as a 
start of more posthuman media ecologies has been explored. In the search for what 
media actually is and does, there are many aspects to consider. Many of the texts are 
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new and the lines of thinking have not necessarily been developed to their “fullest” 
or been the object of heavy debate, yet. Still there is a discussion, both of opening up 
the concept of media, McLuhan style, and a debate on the role of non-humans in 
relation to media. Then there is a question how and if one even can define media in 
any ontological way, which some refuse to do. Can media be anything that creates 
meaning in any possible way? Regardless of how thrilling this exploration might be, 
one is still left with the question of why not talk about media networks or media 
assemblages, why try to completely get rid of any meaning of the word media?     
 
Just as naturecultures has huge implications, difficult to even fully understand, 
medianatures help us to see that looking for explanations in “purity” does not get us 
anywhere. Media and nature are not univocal, but there might be a reason why it is 
difficult to define media. “So what if we should not, paradoxically, start studying 
media from media but from science and the military, and if we should not start 
studying media use from human beings, but from something else?” (Parikka 2012a, 
78).  To be able to locate how different networks, power structures and for example 
unequal representation is formed and maintained it might help to look outside human 
media or outside what traditionally is considered media along with a more traditional 
media and communication research.    
 
One way to see non-human actors is to think about news coverage on a storm for 
example. Hurricane Sandy in 2012 already had a name, and it was clear that Sandy 
would act in a way that would have consequences for humans and non-humans long 
before the storm hit the shore of the Atlantic west coast. This opens up for questions 
like how would film, tv and news look like if they took a less anthropocentric angle? 
How would a news piece on the climate change for example be different if how it 
affects animals would be of news-value? What about representations where animals 
and objects could act, not only be acted upon? These questions, which are questions 
of representation, shows how the aim is not to completely leave representation 
behind but look into their intersections and how the material-semiotic continuum 
works.   
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The post-anthropocentric take on media does not leave out human labour just 
because it includes all living beings. The “demand” for more media technology has 
implications both for the cognitive work and as well as bodies that do repetitive 
machine-like work, not only in factories as mentioned before but also behind 
computers. While writing this thesis I got to experience the material-semiotic aspect 
of writing a thesis on a personal level. The very materiality of writing a thesis 
became clear to me through a body breaking down due to the repetitive work of 
sitting behind a computer. The increasing amount of material-semiotic media does 
not only bring amazing changes and possibilities, it also hurts. 
 
Herbechter is asking for a development of a critical posthumanism (2013). I would 
argue that instead what he is asking for is a critical perspective on the posthuman. 
Posthumanism, as understood in this thesis, partly developed out of critical theory 
and antihumanism, is already highly critical. At the same time, it is abandoning the 
obsession with critique, by taking on a more affirmative approach. Therefore, I have 
to disagree with Herbrechter that a critical posthumanism is needed. It clearly is 
present in the foundation of what I would call posthumanism. That said, what very 
much would be welcomed is a critical take on the posthuman, on cybernetics, 
computer-human relations and robotics. That line of thinking can be interesting from 
a media point of view, and would fit well in a thesis focusing on the posthuman.  
 
There are a few theorists which should be mentioned shortly, Geoffrey Winthrop-
Young is focusing on the materiality of media and Kittler, Jonathan Sterne is 
working with posthumanist sounds and Sean Cubitt on the history of materials, 
which then become media. Eugene Thacker who works with biomedia which looks at 
life as information, should also be mentioned as the mix of information and biology 
hints at a similar fluidity between concepts as medianatures. They are intertwined 
and both needed since biomedia comprehends biological life both as media as well as 
mediation. Another point of view is materiality, Thacker's (2010, 123) material take 
on information, “biology formalize itself as information and that information 
materialize itself as gene or protein” is building on something that also could be 
called material-semiotic. (Thacker 2010.)    
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Posthumanist thoughts has also been developed further in art projects and art theory.  
Some of them could be of interest in relation to media theory, or come close to what 
is discussed here, and are therefore worth mentioning. The dead media project by 
Bruce Sterling looks at media which becomes obsolete (http://www.deadmedia.org) 
and even though the view of media for Sterling is anthropocentric (www.ctheory.net) 
it is an interesting project for looking at what media does. An even more 
posthumanist elaboration, and an answer as well as critique to the call by the dead 
media project to investigate dead media is the zombie media art project by Garnet 
Hertz and Jussi Parikka (2012). Zombie media literally looks at media functioning as 
zombies, or the “living deads of media culture“ and are pointing out that media never 
really dies completely (Parikka 2015b, 141-153). Even though zombie media can 
function as a figure in itself it bears similarity to the aspects of geology of media 
opened up by Parikka later on. As seen above, there are many routes to take if one 
wants to explore a more posthumanist approach to media and communication. What 
connects the different lines of thinking is a focus on media materiality, but a 
perspective that sees that “[m]edia materiality is not contained in the machines, even 
if the machines themselves contain a planet” (Parikka 2015b, 13).   
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5. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has explored the topic of posthumanism, first generally and then more 
specifically from a media perspective in a few different ways. It has put 
posthumanism in an intellectual context and discussed the key concepts of 
posthumanist thought as well as influential thinkers and their differences. It has also 
located posthumanist and new materialist thought in media and communication 
studies and traced these lines of thinking back to McLuhan and Kittler. This thesis 
has mapped various recent developments in media theories concerned with 
materiality and the non-human. It has mostly focused on Jussi Parikka, who is one of 
the key names for posthumanist thinking in relation to media. Regardless if the 
media scholars are calling themselves posthumanists, what is of interest here is how 
the theory they produce intersects with posthumanist lines of thinking, and how these 
intersections can improve our understanding of mediality.   
 
The two concepts at the centre of this thesis, posthumanism and media, are very 
broad and they seem to escape any short and simple definition. What has become 
clear though, is how media, however that is defined, are a more and more important 
part of a posthumanist world. The concept of media might even be one important 
aspect in helping to map that posthumanism, to look at it from a perspective of “we 
do not so much have media as we are media and of media” (Parikka 2010, xxvii). 
Instead of focusing on what media is, I suggest that it is more fruitful to focus on 
what media does as well as what can be done when we conceptualize insects, 
minerals, stars, dogs or viruses as media. 
 
What has also been difficult in the process is the constantly published new material 
on the topic. When I started writing, many of the sources used in this thesis were not 
published, or even written. This complicates the process and keeps on shaping it 
throughout. It has also been interesting to follow how the different aims to define this 
posthumanist turn has taken part in shaping it in different directions. One aspect that 
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makes writing about German media theory, which indeed would be of importance 
here, problematic in a master's thesis in Finland is the language issue. There might be 
many relevant texts that I do not have access to, and the debates might have been 
developed way further. Since I do not speak or read German, I have to stick to what 
is translated into English. There are many works by Wolfgang Ernst and Bernhard 
Siegert that surely would be interesting from a posthumanist point of view for 
example. On the other hand, sources in Finnish and Swedish has been of great help.  
 
Many established concepts and ideas have been brought to question during the 
process. What's the point, one can ask, if a concept like culture is stretched so far that 
it loses its meaning? Is questioning or opening up the concept of media to this length 
exaggerated? Posthumanist theory has implications on how information, 
communication and media is viewed, it changes views on language, culture, humans, 
subjects, minds and bodies and well as matter, nature, robots and computers. Taking 
on a post-anthropocentric view when investigating media and communication can 
lead scholarly work in many directions. It can mean researching the gorilla Koko 
who speaks sign language, looking at how animals are represented in news articles or 
incorporate investigations on how insects communicate. It can also mean seeing 
things like stones and stars as media, since they are storing and transporting 
information. There are many reasons to look into posthumanism for media and 
communication. Firstly, to take part in analysing the prevailing system of oppression 
for everything that lives under post-fordist capitalism. In an era of cognitive or 
information capitalism, media and information is clearly something to investigate 
very carefully.  As mentioned by Parikka, labour is an important aspect in relation to 
media. Planned obsolescence of media devices and the mining of minerals are very 
much connected to a capitalist logic which should not be forgotten in the analysis, 
even though one tries to look at the problems from a post-anthropocentric standpoint.  
 
On an ontological and epistemological level posthumanism impacts what is 
perceived to exist and how one can study it. Through that, it brings new partly 
unexplored areas for media and communication studies to investigate, like dust, 
 
 
77 
electronic waste and various forms of non-human communication. It also challenges 
one think in unfamiliar ways, in naturecultures, or medianatures, to reveal how the 
material-semiotic collaborate. On a more concrete journalistic level, one can think 
about how for example reporting on climate change would look like from a post-
anthropocentric and naturecultures perspective. Another aspect is how anchored 
different forms of representation is with bodies and matter and has consequences on 
many levels, it is not only a question of narratives, but it can have many different 
very real material consequences, even fatal ones. 
 
It also opens up questions like why we do not see communication among non-
humans as communication. Animals communicate, they use tools and show emotions 
but is not considered to be part of culture. What could studying contagion in relation 
to bacteria and viruses teach us about Internet memes going viral? What can we learn 
from swarms of insects about Internet trolls or hacker attacks? There are many 
questions that need further research, and posthumanist theory does not give the all 
answers, yet, but it is opening up spaces and directions for finding those answers.  
 
One aspect with posthumanism is the still missing methodological side. So far what 
is done is mostly creating new concepts. Haraway is a good example of someone 
who creates new concepts that affect the world, without any empirical foundation, 
sometimes even taking on a poetic twist to it. Yet, ironically, posthumanism contains 
critique of post-structuralism for its obsession with language, not being able to take 
the material enough in consideration. Here Lummaa and Rojola remind us about 
Deleuze and Guattari's generous views on philosophy and the creation of new 
concepts: 
 
“Instead of rational reasoning, philosophy is trying things out, the concepts do not 
represent reality but create the possibility for a specific thinking, organizing the 
chaos.” (Lummaa & Rojola 2014, 23; my translation) 
 
There are concepts, not empirically anchored, creating new realities and worlds in 
the posthumanist thinking explored in this thesis. What is fascinating with the topic 
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is still the power of language to transform what exists outside it, the material, 
embodied world. By viewing animals for example differently it might change how 
they are treated, even though that is an anthropocentric and logocentric argument to 
make. What should be remembered is still the different relations of power existing in 
the very limited space we share on earth. And that is one reason why the question is 
important. If one is to embrace anything at all from a posthumanist perspective, it is 
not to make the clear distinction between the semiotic and the material. That leads us 
to the performative aspect of a concept like naturecultures. A concept like 
naturecultures changes worlds even though it does not give any empirical proof. This 
semiotic concept can and has material consequences. Just like for Barad, 
performativity is not only semiotic, and has never been, but instead very corporeal as 
well. Concepts like that can open up to an understanding of for example gender and 
race as semiotically-materially performed categories, instead of natural essences. 
 
Except from the fascinating emancipatory aspects of posthumanism, there is a need 
for caution as well. There is a risk of posthumanism becoming yet another grand 
narrative, especially considering the somewhat messianic aspects that one can 
encounter in some posthumanist theories. Posthumanism is partly pictured as being 
the answer to “all problems” for the last 500 years. And indeed, posthumanism has 
the potential to give a lot of answers but that is also a reason to be on one’s guard. As 
mentioned before, posthumanism is an ontological project with ethical and political 
aspirations. It is fairly simple to go along with the ontological aspects of 
posthumanism, even though that might take some digesting too. What really makes 
the human animal ontologically more special than other animals? While 
ontologically humans are not anyhow special compared to other animals, there are 
still obviously great differences on other levels (Bryant 2014, 215) even though 
maybe not as great as once thought. These differences become important on other 
levels than the purely ontological.  
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The ethical prospects in posthumanist thinking are a bit trickier though, and scholars 
mention the ethical aspect of posthumanism to a great extent. Domanska sees that 
non-anthropocentric humanities and posthumanities constitute ”an institutionalised 
set of research topics, techniques and interests that derives its ethos from the 
intellectual movement and ethical stance called posthumanism” (2010, 118, my 
italics). Braidotti and Barad are described as writing theory which is “immediately 
ontological, epistemological, and ethical” (Dolphijn & van der Tuin 2012, 16) at the 
same time. This is where one might take a more sceptical position on posthumanism. 
Instead of a search for more knowledge, and emancipation through that, what is 
sometimes presented is a more ethical knowledge. The state of the world calls for 
much more ethical sensitivity but ontology and ethics can still be difficult to mix 
justifiably. Looking at what exists is a whole different question than deciding who 
should live and who should not. What I find a little bit troublesome in the discussions 
concerning posthumanism is the mix-up of ontology, politics and ethics. It is 
welcomed to problematize the old distinction between “what is” and “what ought to 
be”, but that needs to be done carefully. Ontology is still something far bigger than 
politics or ethics, which in themselves are concepts staying inside a realm of human 
sociality, for ethics one needs the human (even though posthumanists are working on 
that). Then again, one thing that I have been learned from the posthumanist reasoning 
is that clear borders between separately conceived categories might not be as valid as 
it seems when the words describing them are used. With the performative aspects of 
creation of worlds and becoming in mind, can one really make a clear distinction 
between these two? 
 
As stated in the beginning I do not believe that there would be any research that 
would be outside the political. Therefore, one way to go about it is to situate oneself, 
to explain from which position one is looking. I admire research that is open with its 
aim to change the world in a more just direction. Yet, it might seem like I am 
critiquing some posthumanist thinkers for doing exactly that. Still I claim that there 
is a difference between aiming for ethicality and aiming for a better understanding of 
what exists, or to try to understand why it is that we believe certain things exist and 
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others not. What exists is in itself an extremely political question, ontology has 
consequences for politics and ethics but they are still different kinds of inquiries. 
That however does not mean that that would not be a good aim for research in 
general. What I find problematic is delivering “the truth” under the notion that it is 
ethical. In the name of posthumanism is seems like huge truth claims are made which 
are motivated with them leading to a better and more ethical world. That feels like a 
troublesome mix, even though I cannot think of a better motivation. I also have to 
admit that is one of the reasons posthumanism caught my eye in the first place, 
providing new empowering tools to work with towards a better world.  
 
There are many questions that have been answered during this process but it has also 
opened up for a bunch of new ones. This has only been a start to begin to pick up the 
different threads and there are numerous ways to continue. If one would download 
Latour's theory plug-in and look at the world with more or less posthumanist eyes, 
there are what seems like endless opportunities. One can look inside the machine, 
human or animal. One can look away to stars, ozone holes and ocean streams. One 
can trace networks, assemblages or hybrids in eternity. One can also explore 
affiliated fields like post-representationalism, cultural techniques as well as systems 
theory and naturally cybernetics. They and the posthuman are however not the main 
focus here but there are a lot to look into for others. 
 
One of the questions which has emerged during the process is what would media 
theory look like that would be “simultaneously real, like nature, narrated like 
discourse and collective, like society” (Latour 1993, 6)? It is a question which needs 
a lot of careful investigation and a healthy take on the problem is the critique by 
Vicky Kirby (2008, 216), who is asking why not admit that “the very stuff of the 
body and the processes that purportedly separate thought from carnality are now 
something of a mystery” and start from there. For me posthumanist theory plays the 
great role of showing this mystery so that it can start to be solved in the first place. 
 
 
81 
Except for Bryant’s suggestion for a posthuman media ecology, he also has a clear 
vision of what is needed next: 
 
“What we need is a post-humanist framework that is able to synthesize the findings 
of the linguistic turn, Marxist thought, Foucauldian thought, media theorists such as 
McLuhan, Kittler, and Ong, as well as the post-humanist thought of the ecologists, 
the new materialists, the actor-network theorists, and the work of thinkers such as 
Diamond and Braudel.” (Bryant 2014, 286) 
 
This could be one possible important outcome of posthumanism, if developed in that 
direction. How can one then begin to picture such a framework? That is a task for 
more extensive research than a master’s thesis and a question that needs a lot of 
discussion and debate. It would require that one dares to look into interdisciplinary 
options, dares to take materialities seriously and dares to wish for a less 
anthropocentric and binary world. It would be one way out of the post-structuralist 
labyrinth of deconstruction, by walking into one of its walls and realizing that it 
actually hurts, as well as consists of dirt, minerals, bacteria, fungus and rocks. 
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